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Abstract
This thesis explores how human rights advocacy organizations have influenced the
increased prosecution of conflict-related sexual violence in international criminal courts.
This thesis will use the cases of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
(ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the International
Criminal Court (ICC) to demonstrate that well-established international human rights
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and legal coalitions have been the primary
actors in transnational human rights advocacy networks to influence the investigation and
prosecution of conflict-related sexual violence in international criminal courts. The
objective of the thesis is to focus on the major players in human rights advocacy
networks and examine the evolution of tactics, strategies, and professionalization in their
work to prosecute sexual violence. Transnational human rights advocacy networks have
professionalized and legitimized themselves by becoming legal and investigative experts,
in addition to their roles as advocates. They have in turn refined their investigative and
report writing skills regarding conflict-related sexual violence to a level acceptable to
legal institutions. This professionalization and legitimization has led to professional
contacts and has given them access to legal institutions of international criminal tribunals
and courts. I will argue that the internal dynamics and professionalization of
international human rights advocacy NGOs and legal coalitions provide the best
explanation as to how human rights advocacy networks have influenced the prosecution
of conflict-related sexual violence. Building upon the theory of transnational advocacy
networks, I will identify additional strategies and tactics of transnational human rights
advocacy organizations in influencing legal institutions and international organizations.
By focusing on the internal make-up and dynamics of advocacy organizations centered
on this issue, I will attempt to identify a better understanding of how these organizations
have influenced sexual violence prosecution in international criminal courts and
international legal norms.
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Chapter One: Introduction
Topic
This thesis explores how human rights advocacy organizations have influenced
the increased prosecution of conflict-related sexual violence in international criminal
courts, focusing specifically on the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Court for Rwanda (ICTR), and the
International Criminal Court (ICC). The thesis will highlight the issue of conflict-related
sexual violence and the history of criminalization and prosecution of such violence under
international law. The objective of the thesis is to focus on the major players in human
rights advocacy networks and examine the evolution of their tactics and strategies as well
as their professionalization. By focusing on the internal make-up and dynamics of
advocacy organizations centered on this issue, I will attempt to identify a better
understanding of how these organizations influence international legal norms.
Questions About the Topic
Questions to address in my thesis include the following:
1) In the case of influencing the prosecution of conflict-related sexual violence, who
were the major players?
2) How did large human rights NGOs like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International work collaboratively, if at all, with local NGOs?
3) Do organizations within the networks work together or compete?
4) What were these organizations doing internally to professionalize and legitimize
their efforts?
5) How did human rights advocacy organizations embed themselves into the legal
system of international criminal tribunals and courts?
6) Aside from advocating for this specific prosecution, how did human rights
advocacy networks work with legal institutions? Did they provide investigative
tips and legal expertise?
7) What was their evolution of tactics and strategies from ICTY and ICTR to the
ICC? What type of fact-finding, investigative strategies, and legal expertise have
been improved regarding sexual violence?
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8) Given the legal framework that they are working in, has there been a
professionalization of the networks that has contributed to their influence in
prosecution conflict-related sexual violence? What was the internal make-up of
staff working on this issue?
Transnational Advocacy Networks and International Law
In global affairs today, non-state actors are increasingly playing a role in relations
among states and international organizations. Some of the most visible non-state actors
today are activists who operate in transnational networks and who are bound by shared
principles, ideas, and values with the goal to change the behavior of states and
international organizations.1 Activists in these networks multiply the channels of access
to the international system by building new links and forming new types of power.2
Although states do remain major players in international relations, these growing
networks and evolving relations require new methods of comprehensive analysis.
International relations theory has largely focused on state-centric paradigms for
analyzing the international system. Realist and liberalist approaches are the most firmly
established theories in the field of International Relations, but they seldom acknowledge
or provide insight into transnational politics, activist networks, and the various structures
of influence and communication at international levels. Recognizing this, in their book
Activists Beyond Borders, scholars Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink have developed a
theory based on the rationality and significance of transnational advocacy networks in
international relations.3
Since the development of this theory, realist critics have cast doubt on the
effectiveness of advocacy networks in world politics. Critics of transnational advocacy
1

Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press),
1998), 1.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid, 1-10.
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network theory have focused on the tactical and strategic challenges of transnational
activism and claim that the core information-based strategies are reactive only.4 They
point to the focus on impunity and international legal mechanisms in human rights
campaigns, which have been a central part of transnational activism. Realist critics
further question the efficacy of transnational advocacy networks in the international
system by pointing to the unevenness of norm change, minimal progress in states’
compliance with human rights standards, and contemporary conflicts involving grave
human rights violations.
Although transnational advocacy networks do experience some limitations in the
international system due to the dominance of states, the theory developed by Keck and
Sikkink still serves as a solid foundation for analyzing and understanding the influence
that activist networks have on states and international organizations. I argue that these
criticisms of transnational advocacy theory and advocacy campaigns are entirely
premature because the study of transnational advocacy networks requires more
development into the internal processes of these networks. Such internal processes have
been largely absent from studies on transnational activism.5
By focusing on legal mechanisms and judicial frameworks, transnational
advocacy networks are not only ensuring prosecution and accountability, but they are
also solidifying shared principles and concerns as international norms. In addition,
judicial channels have required increased information-based strategies and legal
expertise. This has served as a foundation to legitimize the efforts of advocacy networks
4

Hans Schmitz “Transnational Human Rights Networks: Significance and Challenges,” The International
Studies Encyclopedia, Volume XI, ed. Robert A. Denmark, (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 7189-7208.
5 Ibid, 7189-7208.
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and human rights campaigns. An analysis of these internal dynamics will lend to an
improved understanding of how these networks have been influential in international
legal frameworks.
Transnational advocacy network theory can be applied to the normative and
institutional changes that have evolved concerning the prosecution of conflict-related
sexual violence under international law. To explore this issue, I will look into the internal
dynamics of human rights advocacy organizations focused on the prosecution of conflictrelated sexual violence and examine the development of such advocacy campaigns
around the prosecution at the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the International Criminal Court
(ICC). This thesis will examine and evaluate the influence of transnational advocacy
networks on this issue of sexual violence prosecution.
Although it is clear that transnational advocacy networks have made significant
contributions to the prosecution of sexual violence in international courts and they have
raised global awareness on the issue, the way in which transnational advocacy networks
have influenced international courts is less understood. As Keck and Sikkink note in their
theory, we must look at the characteristics of the “target,” the “sender,” and the
“source.”6 Advancing the study of transnational advocacy networks requires an
examination beyond the principles and interests of such organizations and demands an
inquiry into the internal dynamics of the “senders,” or participant non-profit
organizations.7 The leaders and staff of such organizations make up these internal

6
7

Keck and Sikkink, 202.
Ibid, 23.
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dynamics, professionalize these organizations, and constantly contribute to their
evolution.
Transnational Advocacy Network Theory
Transnational advocacy networks are comprised of activists, scholars, NGOs, and
other non-state actors working to change issues, interests, and norms around particular
shared values.8 Not only are transnational advocacy networks bound by shared values
and a common discourse, but also by a dense exchange of information and services.9
Keck and Sikkink maintain that transnational advocacy networks are not always
successful in their efforts, but they are increasingly important players in policy debates at
the regional and international level.10
Keck and Sikkink have outlined patterns that are common in campaigns for
transnational advocacy networks, a typology of tactics that networks use in their
persuasion, and stages of network influence. This typology of tactics includes: 1)
information politics, or the ability to quickly and credibly generate politically usable
information and move it to where it will have the most impact, 2) symbolic politics, or
the ability to call upon symbols, actions, or stories that make sense of a situation for an
audience that is frequently far away, 3) leverage politics, or the ability to call upon
powerful actors to affect a situation where weaker members of a network are unlikely to
have influence, and 4) accountability politics or the effort to hold powerful actors to their
previously stated policies or principles.11

8

Ibid, 1-10.
Ibid, 1-27.
10
Ibid, 1-27.
11
Ibid, 16.
9
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In addition, they have theorized two issue characteristics, which transnational
advocacy networks have organized most effectively. These include: 1) issues involving
physical harm to vulnerable individuals, especially when there is a short and clear causal
chain about who bears responsibility; and 2) issues involving legal equality of
opportunity.12
International and domestic NGOs play a prominent role in human rights advocacy
networks by introducing new ideas, providing information, and lobbying for policy
changes.13 This thesis will also point out that NGOs have played a legitimate role by
professionalizing themselves. Examining their role in advocacy networks helps both to
distinguish NGOs from and to see their connections with social movements, state
agencies, and international organizations.14 Arguments can clearly be made on both
positions as to whether or not advocacy campaigns have been successful in prosecuting
conflict-related sexual violence. What the field still needs to explore is how human rights
advocacy campaigns have worked and continue to work to influence the prosecution of
conflict-related sexual violence.
The Situation of Sexual Violence in Conflict
By 1993, the Zenica Centre for the Registration of War and Genocide Crime In
Bosnia-Herzegovina had documented 40,000 cases of war-related rape.15 Of a random
sample of Rwandan women surveyed in 1999, 39 percent reported being raped during the
1994 genocide.16 In 2003, 74 percent of a random sample of 388 Liberian refugee
12

Ibid, 27.
Ibid, 9.
14
Ibid, 6.
15
Jeanne Ward and Mendy Marsh, “Sexual Violence Against Women and Girls in War and Its Aftermath,
Realities, Responses, and Required Sources,” (paper presented at the Symposium on Sexual Violence in
Conflict and Beyond, Brussels, Belgium, June 22-23, 2011), 2.
16
Ibid.
13
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women living in camps in Sierra Leone reported being sexually abused prior to being
displaced from their homes.17 Reports of the Eastern Region of the Democratic Republic
of Congo have shown that 30 percent of women have reported being raped and 22
percent of men have also reported being raped.18 These statistics demonstrate that sexual
violence is quite common in conflict situations around the world. Sexual violence used
systematically as a weapon of war and as a result of militarized aggression has been and
continues to be prevalent in conflict situations.19
Despite these statistics on conflict-related rape and other forms of sexual violence,
they do not portray the extent of the problem because women and girls, as well as men
and boys, are unwilling or unable to report sexual violence for a number of reasons,
including lack of protection under the law. Transnational human rights organizations
have focused on this lack of legal protection as a structural cause of conflict-related
sexual violence. In identifying this causal mechanism, women’s rights and human rights
organizations have concentrated their research and advocacy efforts on influencing the
criminalization and prosecution of such violence in international courts.
International Law and Prosecution
Clear declarations of a woman’s absolute right to sexual integrity in conflict and
the development of sexual violence jurisprudence in international law have emerged
rather recently with the increasing recognition of women’s rights as human rights. The
principal international humanitarian law treaties governing the treatment of civilians in

17

Ibid.
Ibid.
19
Pam Spees, “Women’s Advocacy in the Creation of the International Criminal Court: Changing the
Landscapes of Justice and Power” Signs, Vol. 28. No. 4, (2003), 1235.
18
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armed conflict are the 1949 Geneva Conventions.20 The Geneva Conventions following
World War II included provisions relating to sexual violence that did not explicitly
declare rape and sexual violence as grave breaches, but as violations linked to men’s
honor and women as property. 21
In the early 1990s, following the gross violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the United
Nations Security Council called for the establishment of an ad hoc international war
crimes tribunal.22 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
was therefore established to prosecute those responsible for serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the territory since 1991.23 Following the
formation of this ad hoc tribunal, in mid-1994, the U.N. Security Council established the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) following investigative reports
evidencing that over 600,000 people had been killed in 1994 in Rwanda.24 Similar to the
ICTY, the ICTR was established to prosecute those responsible for genocide and other
gross violations of international humanitarian law in Rwanda.25
Investigations led by the United Nations, prosecution teams, and nongovernmental organizations such as Human Rights Watch, substantiated allegations that
hundreds of thousands of women, children, and men were victims of rape and other forms
of sexual violence in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. The ICTY
and the ICTR did not initially include wide reaching criminalization of rape and sexual
20

Kelly Askin, War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes, (Boston: Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, 1997), 2.
21
Spees, 1239.
22
Askin, 2.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
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violence in their statutes, but they are widely considered to be the foundation for
prosecuting sexual violence in international law. 26 The ICTY secured its first conviction
for rape in the ground-breaking 2001 Foca verdict, which confirmed the use of rape as a
crime against humanity.27 In the 1998 verdict against Jean-Paul Akayesu, the ICTR
handed down the first genocide conviction by an international court and the first
conviction for rape as an act of genocide.28
This foundation can be directly traced to the efforts of activist networks in
pressuring and persuading the ICTY and the ICTR to prosecute sexual violence as a
crime against humanity and genocide. Advocacy organizations publicized the issue,
provided information to the courts based on their own reports and investigations, supplied
amicus briefs to the courts, and provided a link between the courts and to victims.29 In
fact, research of political scholars has demonstrated that impunity campaigns have been a
principal part of transnational activism and have been a key influence in the rapid
creation of transitional justice mechanisms during the 1990s, including the establishment
of the ICC.30
Directly following the first prosecutions and convictions of wartime sexual
violence at the ICTY and the ICTR, activist networks continued to mobilize to influence
the prosecution of sexual violence at the ICC. The 1998 Rome Statute of the ICC, which
entered into force on July 1, 2002, promised to prosecute those most responsible for
Ashley Dallman, “Prosecuting Conflict Related Sexual Violence at the International Criminal Court,”
Sipri Insights on Peace and Security, No. 1 (2009), 5.
27
Ibid, 5.
28 Askin, 2.
29 Patricia Viseur Sellers, “The Prosecution of Sexual Violence in Conflict: the Importance of Human
Rights as a Means of Interpretation, “ (UN Office of the High Commissioner from Human Rights, October
7, 2011).
30
Schmitz, 7216.
26
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grave human rights violations, including rape and other forms of sexual violence.31
Current international criminal law, as implemented through the ICC, specifies that sexual
violence, including rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, and
enforced sterilization, as a crime against humanity and as serious violations of the laws
and customs applicable in international armed conflict.32 This specific criminalization
and prosecution of sexual violence is evidence that there are increasing norms and
institutional changes for addressing sexual violence in conflict.
The ICC has opened investigations into the Central African Republic, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, the Darfur region of Sudan, the northern region of
Uganda, and Kenya. While charges of sexual violence and rape constituting crimes
against humanity and war crimes have been added to some prosecutions, due to poor
investigations, the burden of proof, and lack of political will, some charges of sexual
violence have been dropped in prosecutions.33 Although the record of the ICC to
investigate and prosecute sexual violence has been mixed, advancements have been made
due to the continued pressure, organization, and density of activist networks around the
issue. NGOs have continued to bring awareness to the issue globally and they have
provided assistance and information to the ICC in the effort to maintain and increase
sexual violence prosecutions. Since the watershed prosecutions at the ICTY and the
ICTR, advocacy networks of human rights organizations have honed their skills in
influencing judicial frameworks and working within legal mechanisms. While it is
apparent that advocacy networks have been fundamental in the development of conflictrelated sexual violence prosecutions in international courts through their advocacy
31

Dallman, 1.
Sellers, 12.
33
Dallman, 9.
32
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campaigns, it is less understood how these organizations have developed internally to
influence prosecution in international courts.
Hypothesis
In addition to the limited studies on the internal dynamics of human rights
advocacy networks, there is also a dearth of scholarship on the role of the legal
community in enforcing human rights.34 Legal communities maintain transnational
contacts based on professional interests, which suggests that human rights advocacy
networks relied on more than just the politics of information, symbols, leverage, and
accountability. Human rights advocacy networks have professionalized and legitimized
themselves by becoming legal and investigative experts, in addition to their roles as
advocates. They have in turn refined their investigative and report writing skills
regarding conflict-related sexual violence to a level acceptable to legal institutions. This
professionalization and legitimization has led to professional contacts and has given them
access to legal institutions of international criminal tribunals and courts.
My thesis will use the cases of the ICTY, the ICTR, and the ICC to demonstrate
that international human rights NGOs and legal communities have been the primary
actors in human rights advocacy networks to influence the investigation and prosecution
of conflict-related sexual violence under international human rights and humanitarian
law. I will argue that the internal dynamics and professionalization of human rights
advocacy NGOs provide the best explanation as to how human rights advocacy networks
have influenced the prosecution of conflict-related sexual violence. Building upon the
theory of transnational advocacy networks set forth by Keck and Sikkink, I will identify

34

Schmitz, 7212.
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additional strategies and tactics of human rights advocacy organizations in influencing
legal institutions and international organizations.
Methodology
The comparative case studies of the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC are made up of various
components. First, descriptions of the establishment of the courts are outlined including
transnational advocacy participation in the formation of the courts. Next, an examination
is made into how advocacy networks interacted and influenced sexual violence
prosecution in each court. Finally, the question of how advocacy strategies changed or
evolved in each court is explored.
I will draw on qualitative analysis of secondary sources to analyze how
transnational human rights organizations have influenced the prosecution of sexual
related violence. This includes NGO reports and briefing papers, scholarly journal
articles, press releases, and case documents from the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC. I will then
analyze and draw conclusions from prosecutions from the ICTY, ICTR, and the ICC in
an effort to better understand how advocacy organizations have influenced prosecution. I
will also collect data on the prosecutions and charges related to sexual violence at all
three courts.
Given the limited information regarding the internal processes of these
organizations in their advocacy efforts for prosecuting such violence, I gathered
information from seven personal interviews with members and staff of these
organizations, who have specific professional experience with international justice
advocacy and conflict-related sexual violence prosecutions. (Brief biographies of those
individuals who were interviewed as well as interview transcriptions are included in the

16

appendices of this thesis.) The semi-structured interviews will allow me to ask new
questions that arose while also drawing on the aforementioned thesis questions.
Limitations
It should be noted that obtaining interviews from professionals with this specific
experience proved to be difficult given the busy schedules of these professionals. The
quantity of such personal interviews has therefore been quite limited. Even with the
limitations in gathering evidence from personal interviews, thoughtful interpretation and
analysis can be made when cross-checked with scholarly articles and documentation of
the role of transnational advocacy networks in the prosecution of sexual violence at the
ICTY, ICTR, and the ICC.
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Chapter Two: Literature Review
Theoretical Background
This chapter offers a synopsis and assessment of the scholarly work on
transnational advocacy networks, which will serve as a foundation for developing the
ideas and arguments set forth in this thesis. The chapter begins with a brief overview and
description of the origins of the general groundwork of this theoretical approach. Then, I
explore the major contributions of two leading scholars (Keck and Sikkink) to this
theoretical framework. Next, I consider subsequent contributions of other theorists and
scholars that have emerged within this framework. In addition, I note persistent gaps in
transnational advocacy network theory, which demonstrate that additions should be made
to the paradigm.
As previously noted in the introductory chapter, the most established theoretical
approaches in the field of international relations, namely neo-realism and liberalism, have
discredited the importance of transnational activism by focusing primarily on statecentric paradigms for analyzing the international system. Despite this state-centric
dominance, in the past two decades, the field of international relations has provided an
increasing wealth of literature and research on the study of transnational politics and
activism. The emergence of this trend can be traced back to political science scholars
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, who are credited for developing a theory based
specifically on the significance of transnational advocacy networks in the international
system.35

35

Schmitz, 5.
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Prior to the theoretical insights of Keck and Sikkink, which were generated
through qualitative research, few theories attempted to explain transnational activism and
advocacy networks.36 The exploration of transnationalism and transnational interactions
was a precursor to the study of advocacy-oriented transnational interactions. Noteworthy
scholars who established transnationalism as a challenge to state-centered theories in
international relations are Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane.
Nye and Keohane contended that states are by no means the only actors in world
politics and they noted that little theoretical attention has been paid to the interactions that
involve nongovernmental actors, individuals, and organizations.37 They argued that nongovernmental actors play a significant role in world politics and they defined
“transnational interactions” as the movement of tangible or intangible items across state
boundaries when at least one actor is not an agent of a government or an
intergovernmental organization.38 By stressing the importance of these transnational
interactions, Nye and Keohane challenged realism and asserted that transnational
relations alter relationships between governments and change state attitudes.
Although Nye and Keohane set a precedent and addressed transnational interactions
within their theory of complex interdependence, they did not succeed in motivating a
self-sustaining research agenda on the significance of transnational actors.39
Constructivism in international relations theory and social movement theory in
comparative politics provided a gateway for scholars to instigate new theoretical
frameworks to explore transnational activism and transnational social movement
36

Keck and Sikkink, 5.
Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Robert O. Keohane, “Transnational Relations and World Politics: An
Introduction,” International Organization, Vol. 25, No. 3, (1971), 330.
38
Ibid, 332.
39
Schmitz, 5.
37
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organizations.
Social movement theory draws from various interdisciplinary fields with social
sciences, but has minimal recognition in the field of international relations. The
theoretical framework of social movements surveys why social mobilization occurs and
the social, cultural, and political outcomes of such mobilization. By offering historically
specific formulations, social movement theory provides a wealth of information about the
roots of contemporary social activism, the features of such activism, and the dynamics of
movement emergence.40 Although social movement theory is useful for understanding
the social structures that shape contemporary activism, it does not explore how social
movement activism operates, which has limited its overall contribution to the study of
transnational advocacy networks.41
Like social movement theory, constructivism has a sociological approach, but it is
a more widely accepted theory in the field of international relations. Constructivism
provides a broad underpinning from which scholars in international relations have been
able to draw from to examine both how and why transnational activism and advocacy
networks function. One of the leading social constructivists in the field of international
relations, Alexander Wendt, notes that the core of constructivism involves two basic
claims: “that the fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than
strictly material, and that these structures shape actors’ identities and interests, rather than
just their behavior.”42 Constructivists hypothesize that social structures are made up of
social relationships, which are defined by shared understandings, expectations, and
40

Steven M. Buechler, “New Social Movement Theories,” The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 3
(1995), 441-464.
41

Ibid, 460.
Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1995),
71-81.
42
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knowledge. These social structures constitute the actors in a situation and the nature of
their relationships.43 Constructivism is concerned with how the social and political
worlds work and with the idea that the collectivity of norms makes behavioral claims on
actors.44 Constructivism, therefore, easily supports the notion that norms coming from
transnational advocacy networks and organizations could influence the behavior of states
without having traditional sources of power.
One of the most visible forms of transnational activism is the transnational human
rights movement, which surfaced following World War II and gained momentum towards
the end of the Cold War. The increased attention to social movement theory and a
constructivist paradigm, combined with the sustained growth of the transnational
advocacy organizations (specifically human rights advocacy organizations) fueled
scholarly interest in a shaping a theoretical framework to understand how transnational
activism operates.45
Transnational Advocacy Network Theory
In their book, Activists Beyond Borders, Keck and Sikkink, built upon the existing
theoretical frameworks mentioned above and introduced the role and influence of
transnational advocacy networks, including human rights activism, in world politics.46
Several studies have taken up the ideas expressed in Activists beyond Borders and
refined the theoretical understanding of why and how transnational advocacy groups
can change the domestic practices of governments.47 The criticism of their work that has

43

Ibid, 73.
Jeffrey T. Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," World Politics, 50
(1998), 325
45
Schmidt, 5.
46
Keck and Sikkink, 1-10.
47 Schmidt, 5.
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emerged, as well as the spring of scholarly work that builds upon and refines their
theoretical assumptions, indicates that not only is Keck and Sikkink’s work valuable to
the field of international relations, but that transnational advocacy networks do, in fact,
play a noteworthy role in world politics. Although aspects of Keck and Sikkink’s theory
were briefly discussed in the introductory chapter, it is worth revisiting and describing at
more length some of their theoretical claims, as they have been significantly useful in
informing background knowledge for this thesis.
Keck and Sikkink provide a solid foundation to their work by clearly defining the
terms that they use. As this thesis seeks to build upon Keck and Sikkink’s theory of
transnational advocacy networks, the terms that they coined will be used throughout this
thesis. The “networks” that Keck and Sikkink refer to are forms of organization
characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and
exchange.48 Advocates defend causes and stand up for the causes of others. “Advocacy
networks” are therefore organized to promote causes, principled ideas, policy changes,
and norms.49 Keck and Sikkink use the term “transnational advocacy network” to
describe networks that are comprised of activists, scholars, NGOs, and other non-state
actors working to change issues, interests, and norms around particular shared values.50
By creating links through these networks, activists significantly increase access to
the international system. Although activists do not have power in the traditional sense,
by coming together as a dense network around a particular campaign, activists may be
able to wield influence in global affairs. Campaigns are described as sets of strategically
linked activities in which members of networks develop explicit, visible ties, and
48

Keck and Sikkink, 8.
Ibid, 8.
50
Ibid, 1-10.
49
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mutually recognized roles in pursuit of a common goal.51 Transnational advocacy
networks are bound by a typology of tactics used for persuasion, which enables them to
exert a form of power. This typology of tactics includes 1) the politics of generating and
disseminating information, 2) using symbols to frame stories and issues, 3) using
leverage of powerful actors to influence a situation, and 4) holding powerful actors
accountable for previously stated policies.52
Keck and Sikkink examine the efficacy of transnational advocacy networks by
analyzing various campaigns that networks have waged, including the campaign to
combat violence against women. Through these case studies, Keck and Sikkink were
able to identify how and why advocacy networks are likely to emerge. They also
assessed the influence of transnational advocacy networks campaigns by the various
levels of influence that they exerted at domestic and international levels.
Given the insight from their case studies, Keck and Sikkink theorized two specific
issues, which transnational advocacy networks have organized around most effectively.
These include: 1) issues involving bodily harm to vulnerable individuals, especially when
there is a short and clear causal chain about who bears responsibility; and 2) issues
involving legal equality of opportunity.53 It is therefore little surprise that human rights is
the issue area around which the largest number of international NGOs has organized
around.54 Keck and Sikkink’s findings consequently best explain the emergence and
influence of transnational human rights advocacy networks.

51

Ibid, 6.
Ibid, 16.
53
Ibid, 27.
54 Ibid, 12.
52
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As previously noted, Keck and Sikkink’s primary focus is whether or not
transnational advocacy networks are effective, and their research leans towards a more
positive view on these types of networks in the international system. Although Activists
Beyond Borders does not focus on the internal dynamics of these networks, Keck and
Sikkink’s book does provide some insight into these dynamics and proposes that further
research should conducted. Their research suggests that international and domestic
NGOs play a central role in all advocacy networks by initiating actions and ideas,
providing information, and pressuring more powerful actors.55 Furthermore, transnational
networks typically involve a small number of activists from the organizations involved in
a given campaign.56 If a relatively small number of activists from NGOs play a major role
in advocacy networks, then clearly more research should be made to focus on the
evolution of strategies that activists use and the internal dynamics of organizations.
Building on Transnational Advocacy Network Theory
An important article that builds upon ideas from Keck and Sikkink while also
providing invaluable information on current theoretical contentions and gaps on
transnational advocacy networks, is “Transnational Human Rights Networks:
Significances and Challenges” by scholar Hans Schmidt. In this article, Schmidt
provides a historical overview of the study of advocacy networks in social science and
surveys criticism of transnational advocacy campaigns.57 Aspects of his historical review
are reflected in the theoretical background section of this chapter. While being aware of
the criticisms is vital to any researcher, it is beyond the scope of this literature review and
thesis to focus on the criticisms of transnational advocacy networks outlined by Schmidt.
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More importantly, in the third and four sections of his article, Schmidt reviews the
ways in which the transnational advocacy sector itself has evolved and examines the
internal dynamics of transnational networks and individual organizations.58 In fact, he
focuses almost exclusively on human rights advocacy and stresses that there is relatively
little information and research on the internal dynamics of these networks and
organizations. Although subsequent scholars and authors noted in this literature review
do provide notable contributions to the field of study on transnational advocacy networks,
Schmidt’s work is particularly useful in identifying the areas in this field that have little
attention and require further research.
An important point that Schmidt makes, but does not fully explore, is that the
study of transnational advocacy and NGO activism focuses almost exclusively on how
activism is driven by shared principles and informal exchanges.59 An area that has been
absent from these studies is that the legal community increasingly plays a role in these
advocacy networks, forging professional standards and expertise, and lending additional
legitimacy to campaigns.60 This suggests that organizations have legitimized and
professionalized themselves through contacts with legal experts, thus sustaining contacts
for professional interests, not just by shared principles. The professional networking and
contacts with the legal communities also indicates some of the ways in which human
rights advocacy networks have strategically evolved.
Schmidt identified several key developments in transnational human rights
activism that have evolved since the publication of Activists Beyond Borders.61 First,
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advocacy networks play a significant role in the creation and evolution of international
institutions, which can be seen in the establishment of the ICC and the inclusion of sexual
violence in the definition of war crimes.62 Although advocacy networks’ efforts do not
always end in success, their success in recognizing human rights in international courts is
of particular interest for the this thesis. A second key development that Schmidt noted is
that transnational human rights advocacy networks began in the 1990s to gradually
address human rights violations committed by non-state actors and not just state
governments.63
Schmidt’s deduces that the advancement of the study of transnational human
rights advocacy networks requires an investigation into the internal dynamics of
participant NGOs.64 While researchers have increased knowledge of the principles and
interests of such organizations, knowledge of what these organizations look like on the
inside and how they operate is scant.65 Inquiries into these internal dynamics entails a
look at the organizational leadership, professional contacts, membership, staff, and
advisors, who mold the interests, principles, and actions of the organizations.66
Schmidt furthers his studies by examining some of the evolutionary changes of the
sector in his article with Emily B. Rodio, “Beyond Norms and Interest: Understanding
the Evolution of Transnational Human Rights Activism.”67 In this article, they outline
how human rights advocacy organizations have shifted from reactive “shaming”
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strategies to more proactive efforts in order to address some of the root causes of gross
human rights violations. Schmidt and Rodio argue that the evolution of transnational
human rights activism now represents a “more effective response to human rights
violations and atrocities committed around the world” and these NGOs are shaping the
diffusion of human rights norms.68 While they focus primarily on Amnesty International,
their findings seem to be representative of most major human rights NGOs as Amnesty
International serves a central role in international human rights activism.
Schmidt and Rodio used qualitative methods to examine the changes in the
reporting practices of Amnesty International. Their findings that show how this type of
advocacy has evolved internally is useful for this thesis, as well as their background
information on the history of transnational human rights activism. They note that the
professionalization and media-driven character of transnational human rights advocacy
campaigns has led to the visibility of human rights today.69 While this
professionalization has led some scholars to focus on arguments that these organizations
are strictly self-interested and concerned for organizations survival, Schmidt and Rodio
encourage scholars to move beyond the dichotomy of “norms versus interests” and focus
on the “evolution of transnational activism.”70
Scholar Charli Carpenter explores specific aspects of internal processes of
advocacy networks in her article, “Setting the Advocacy Agenda: Theorizing Issue
Emergence and Non-emergence in Transnational Advocacy Networks.” Carpenter
emphasizes that current literature on transnational advocacy networks does not explore
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the process by which advocacy networks select issues around which to mobilize.71
Carpenter developed an analytical framework on issue emergence by comparing two
prominent issues in transnational advocacy networks to issues largely absent from these
networks.72
Carpenter described “issue emergence” as the conceptual link between the bad
things in the world and the specific persuasive mechanisms of advocacy.73 “Issue
adoption” occurs when the issue is backed by at least one major player in a broad
transnational advocacy network.74 When an issue has been defined and adopted by a
major NGO or a well-respected intellectual, then the issue has truly emerged within a
transnational advocacy network. In short, international advocacy is only possible after an
issue in world affairs is defined as a problem by activists and then adopted as an issue by
major players in advocacy networks.75 Although Carpenter’s case studies of children
born of wartime rape are not specifically related to the case studies later presented in this
thesis, her research encourages scholars to explore why major NGOs have such a strong
role in issue emergence and generally, how and why advocacy networks define and adopt
particular issues.
While Carpenter notes that there are many questions yet to be answered regarding
advocacy networks, she notes that one clear fact about these networks is that major
organizations function as gatekeepers for access to international institutions and influence
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in world politics.76 In the field of human rights, Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch are examples of such major organizations. As evidenced in their websites
and published reports, these major organizations do not simply address every human
rights violation in the world. Instead, they are selective in the number and type of issues
that they actually promote and advocate for. These organizations are clearly strategic
about the issues that they advocate for and their position in a broader transnational human
rights advocacy network. In order to improve the analytical framework of issue
emergence and the theoretical framework of transnational advocacy network scholarship
in general, Carpenter suggests that scholars not only examine the internal politics of
advocacy networks, but also the internal dynamics of “gatekeeping” organizations.77
Another aspect of scholarship on advocacy networks that has been rather
unexplored but is gaining increasing attention, is the influence of such networks on
international law. In his article, “Nongovernmental Organizations and International
Law,” Steve Charnovitz argues that NGOs contribute to the development, interpretation,
judicial application, and enforcement of international law.78 Charnovitz explores five
specific issues related to this topic, which suggest that NGOs that have legal and
investigative expertise, as well as the goal to influence international relations, can be
influential because they are included in the professional proceedings in international
courts concerning human rights issues. The five chapters of this article examine the
following topics; NGO identity and inclusion into state decision making, legal status of
NGOs in international law, the historical influence of NGOs in international law,
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democratic legitimacy of NGO participation, and whether intergovernmental decision
makers have a duty to consult NGOs.79
A central aspect to NGO identity is their ability to be creative and independent
because they are not limited by states like international organizations. By continuously
developing and functioning with independence and a moral authority, NGOs are able to
wield influence through the persuasiveness of their ideas.80 Charnovitz concludes that
international law is susceptible to being influenced by NGOs because NGOs are
independent experts and they seek to sell norms to authoritative decision makers.81
In addition to the influential nature and identity of NGOs, consultative recognition
within international organizations and courts has paved the way for NGOs to influence
global politics and international law. In 1950, the United Nations Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC) implemented Article 71, which granted a consultative role for
NGOs.82 Charnovitz traces the foundation of NGO efforts to strengthen international law
to Article 71.83 Article 71 established a norm of NGO consultancy throughout the UN
system, which eventually spread to international criminal courts.
This norm of NGO consultancy status and influence in international tribunals and
courts is present today. Although NGOs tend to be particularly productive around the
emergence of new fields in law and they initiate action by seeking to contribute to
international adjudication through friend-of-the-court submissions, international tribunals
and courts are also active in seeking the expertise, information, and ideas of NGOs.84 In
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fact, international tribunals and courts (with an exception of the International Court of
Justice), developed procedures to enable NGOs to submit information, investigative
reports, and statements related to pending cases.85 In some cases, the ICTY and the ICTR
have specifically requested amicus brief submissions from NGOs. In order to assist the
development of international law, the UN Security Council has even called upon NGOs
to gather and submit information regarding violations of international humanitarian law.86
This suggests that in their dealings with international organizations and courts, NGOs
have established a legitimacy that is now being acknowledged. Not only are NGOs
themselves seeking to influence international law, but the very institutions that they lobby
are tacitly expecting them to influence international law through their legitimate wealth
of information, ideas, and expertise.
Critical views of the goals of transnational human rights advocacy networks and
their influence on transnational criminal justice is an important area of scholarship that
can build upon the largely positive outlooks of Keck and Sikkink. J. Snyder and L.
Vinjamuri take such a critical view in their article, “Trials and Errors: Principle and
Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice.”87 Snyder and Vinjamuri first discuss
strains of constructivism and the role of human rights advocacy networks in promoting
norm change in international relations. Constructivism has not examined judicial
accountability for human rights violations, which is noteworthy because “NGOs and
legalists advocating war crimes tribunals implicitly hold to the constructivist theory.”88
Snyder and Vinjamuri contend that advocacy groups strictly follow “logic of
85
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appropriateness” rather than “logic of consequences,” which may undermine the
institutionalization of justice rather than advance it.89
Even though this thesis steers away from assessing the positive and negative
aspects of transnational advocacy networks and focuses instead on internal dynamics of
these groups as they influence international criminal prosecutions, Snyder and
Vinjamuri’s analysis provides important insight and questions into advocacy networks’
push for judicial accountability. A considerable portion of the work of transnational
human rights advocacy networks focuses on the rule of law in world politics,
strengthening legal norms, and establishing international judicial institutions. There are
many norms that these advocacy networks assume including that of criminal
accountability for war crimes and a universal system of international criminal justice.
These norms are considered among transnational advocacy networks as “appropriate
standards of behavior.”90 The following assumption is that as the norm becomes
embodied in legal institutions such as the ICTR, the ICTY, and the ICC, it should begin
to have a deterrent effect. However, Snyder and Vinjamuri warn that legalist tactics for
strengthening human rights norms can backfire or be simply irrelevant when institutional
and social preconditions for the rule of law are lacking. 91
They further argue that decisions to prosecute should not be recognized as the only
legitimate tool for serving the broader interest of human rights.92 In sum, this article does
not completely denounce the legal norms emphasized by these advocacy networks, but
warns that they may not necessarily deter subsequent war crimes and they have the
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possibility of hindering efforts to defuse ethnic tensions.93
Another work that has provided a summation of background information and
informed this thesis on criticisms and relatively unexplored issues in the study of
transnational advocacy networks is Richard Price’s article, “Transnational Civil Society
and Advocacy in World Politics.” This article is a comprehensive review of the
following scholarly books on transnational activism:
1) Moral Victories: How Activists Provoke Multilateral Action by Susan Burgerman
2) Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights
Norms by Ann Marie Clark
3) Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War by Matthew
Evangelista
4) The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society by Ann Florini
5) Non-State Actors and Authority in the Global System by Richard Higgott,
Geoffrey Underhill, and Andreas Bieler
6) Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics by
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink
7) Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and
Norms by Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink
Price identified these books as being part of the current and progressive research
agenda on the role of transnational advocacy in world politics.94 Price argues that this
research on transnational activism demonstrates the increasing influence and leverage of
civil society. The research further demonstrates that transnational civil society matters
and that advocacy network research “constitutes a powerful theoretical counter” to
domestic preference and state centric theories.95 Price finds that that each book offers
different findings, which point to the difficulty of “conceptually mapping everything such
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actors do and seek.”96 The consistent activities of advocacy networks that Price was able
to glean from the books he reviewed consist of agenda setting, developing solutions,
creating norms, recommending policy change, building networks and coalitions of allies,
and employing tactics of persuasion and pressure to change practices and/or norms.
Price also acknowledges that further systematic research on this topic must go into
why some campaigns succeed, but others fail. The success of some campaigns seems to
be derived from a combination of expertise, moral influence, and claims to political
legitimacy.97 Human rights activists and organizations rely on their status and reputation
as legitimate experts of objective knowledge and information.
One of the shortcomings of the research on the success or failure of transnational
activism may lie in the fact that the research has overwhelmingly focused on domestic
structures. A focus on how influence is exerted on international institutions may bolster
the current research. Looking at institutions may provide significant insight as “activists
not only try to make use of the political opportunity structures they are presented with,
but they also try to make those structures themselves.”98
Price also raises two additional forms of constructive criticism for the future
discourse on transnational advocacy and civil society. First, other international relations
theories, such as realism, constructivism and rational choice, are not mentioned or
discussed in the volume on transnational civil society that Price reviewed. He argues that
this research therefore is not fully equipped to defend itself against the first objections
that will emerge from alternative theoretical perspectives.99 It is therefore important for
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further systematic research to address or at least acknowledge different theoretical
approaches. Secondly, more attention in this field should be paid to how activists
themselves learn and strategize, both substantively about the issues they become involved
in and strategically about how to get what they want.100 In order to fully comprehend the
role of transnational advocacy networks in world politics, it is imperative to understand
how they strategize internally.
In their article, “Transnational Information Politic: NGO Human Rights Reporting
1986-2000,” James Ron, Howard Ramos, and Kathleen Rodgers extend their analysis of
transnational advocacy networks by exploring the internal dynamics of large NGOs
regarding their strategies of information politics.101 To do this, they study the country
reporting of Amnesty International and draw on interviews from staff. There are various
factors, including human rights conditions that determine the volume of country
reporting. Reporting on specific countries is part of a specific strategy for these large
NGOs to maximize advocacy opportunities and shape international norms.102
This article further analyzes these strategies by accessing their strengths and
weaknesses. Although this article does explore information politics, it only provides
insight into a specific aspect of information politics because it narrows its scope to the
volume of country reporting. Regardless, the study of the volume of country reporting
and the information on some of the internal dynamics of major NGOs are informative for
this thesis.
Amnesty International is not only one of the largest international human rights
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NGOs, but it is one of the major players in transnational human rights advocacy
networks. The group has the longest history and broadest name recognition in the field
and is believed by many to set standards for the human rights advocacy movement as a
whole.103 For example, their methods of information gathering and professional
advocacy are also used with other NGOs who are major players in advocacy networks.
The professional contacts of former Amnesty International employees are spread
throughout the broader transnational advocacy network, which diffuses the group’s
principles, tactics, and worldviews. In addition to their professional advocacy, Amnesty
International is also a major player due to its legitimacy. Among academics, Amnesty
International is viewed as a reliable source of information, and public trust in Amnesty's
reputation is similarly high.104
An interesting finding is that their research did not find strong statistical support for
the notion that strong, mobilized local advocates attract major international NGOs to
engage with a region, issue or country.105 This finding does not necessarily suggest that
international NGOs don’t work and collaborate with local NGOs, rather, it suggests that
they are attracted to different happenings in global affairs that enable them to exert the
most influence. Such happenings include news releases and the media. Although these
NGOs work to influence the media’s agenda and promote human rights awareness
through media coverage, they are also keenly aware of the media's current interests, and
often respond accordingly.106
Although there are some findings of strategies and internal dynamics of major
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international NGOs, ultimately the research and analysis for this article are mostly
focused on the written work of Amnesty International and less on internal mechanisms
and dynamics. However, this article furthers the research for the field of transnational
human rights advocacy networks and reveals some of the complexities of leading
transnational NGOs. The “pragmatic” and “politically savvy” strategies of these leading
NGOs have allowed them to exert considerable influence in specific areas and gain
achievements for human rights.107
As previously mentioned, there is currently not a wealth of scholarly research on
how human rights NGOs have transformed and professionalized themselves. In the
article, “Professionalized Representation of Human Rights NGOs to the United Nations,”
Kerstin Martens focuses on the professionalization of human rights NGOs and argues that
NGOs have increasingly invested in their international presence and gradually
professionalized.108 Martens studies the professionalization of NGO representation to the
UN with four cases studies of international human rights organizations: Amnesty
International, Human Rights Watch, the International Federation of Human Rights and
the International League for Human Rights. Although Martens does not identify these
organizations as “gatekeepers” or major players within transnational advocacy networks,
her focus on these NGOs’ internal organizational developments provides some
explanation as to how they are influential in international affairs.
Martens argues that internal organizational developments of international NGOs
explain the how they deliver valuable information and research on human rights
violations to UN commissions and committees, how they provide knowledge and
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expertise during negotiation processes of international human rights law and declarations,
and how they monitor and supervise the implementation of human rights standards and
principles.109 Martens’ data collection has influenced and informed this thesis as she
acquired most of her data through semi-standardized expert interviews with NGO and
UN staff and representatives.110 While Martens draws theoretically from social
movement theory to explain the professionalization of international human rights NGOs,
her insights build upon the transnational advocacy network theory that Keck and Sikkink
established.
Martens’ discussion of the definition of professionalization has also informed this
thesis. She states that, “Professionalization describes the process whereby problems are
increasingly dealt with by persons with relevant subject-specific knowledge, experiences
and training, rather than by staff members solely recruited for their previous political
activism or engagement in the organization.”111 The educational and professional
background of the staff of these NGOs as well as their highly specific knowledge and
expertise are highly valued as they provide the organizations with a professional edge for
dealing with states and international institutions. Professionalization therefore establishes
quality standards within the work of an NGO to make it legitimate and ultimately more
“effective and efficient in contributing and shaping political processes.”112
The organizational dedication to quality standards consequently shapes and
sharpens the strategies and tactics of the organization. One of the professional strategies
that Martens identified of major NGOs is appointing personnel to establish NGO offices

109

Ibid, 19.
Ibid, 20.
111
Ibid, 21.
112
Ibid, 21.
110

38

in state or intergovernmental organizations or the setting up of a special section within
the international headquarters of an NGO dedicated to its relations with the UN.113
International unitary NGOs, with a guiding international headquarters and dependent
national members sections that conform to the mandate of the organization, are those
NGOs, which have professionalized. These international unitary NGOs are generally
able to professionalize more than local NGOs due to their financial resources and
additional resources, which enable them to devote their energy towards professional
standards.
In fact, NGOs are increasingly invited to participate in UN commissions and
committees, due to their legal expertise and technical skills.114 Prior to the 1990s, human
rights NGOs were viewed by states and international organizations as amateurish, but
now they are viewed as legitimate players in global affairs due to their highly specialized
expertise. Martens notes that many staff and representatives of these major international
human rights NGOs have gone through higher educational programs, hold post-graduate
degrees, and/or have an LLM degree in international law with a specialization in
international human rights.115 This professional expertise has allowed these NGOs to
gain internal access to UN mechanisms and work closely with UN staff to provide legal,
investigative, and research expertise. Consequently, the insider access and “legitimate”
reputation has enabled them to advocate more efficiently and exert more influence in
international affairs related to human rights issues.
In their article, “NGO Research Program: A Collective Action Perspective,” Erica
Johnson and Aseem Prakash use a collective action approach to examine why NGOs
113
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emerge, how they function, how they are structured, and what strategies they employ to
ensure accountability.116 Their explanations of NGO structure and strategies provide the
most significant analytical tools for this thesis. Johnson and Prakash note that NGOs
exhibit core characteristics of collection action perspective: “(1) a view of institutions as
bundles of contracts between (2) principals and agents whose interactions are governed
by (3) hierarchical control rather than decentralized exchanges between anonymous
agents.”117
While they note that scholars such as Keck and Sikkink emphasize the character of
NGOs to pursue normative goals, collective action is the study of conditions under which
individuals might cooperate to pursue common goals.118 This perspective is instructive
for understanding internal dynamics and strategies of NGOs because individuals must
pursue more than just a normative agenda. In fact, individuals pursue collective action
because they believe that pooling resources and coordinating strategies with like-minded
actors can achieve more influence in international affairs, which is one of the goals of
human rights advocacy NGOs.119 Additionally, the goal to influence norms means that
internally, “NGOs must choose between the tactics of protesting the political status quo
or working within conventional channels to implement new policies.”120 Regardless of
which tactic is chosen, in order to be prominent actors, Johnson and Prakash point out
that the organizational structure and personnel have become increasingly
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professionalized.121 Therefore, the collective action approach explains that NGOs use
professionalization to pursue common goals in world politics.

121

Ibid, 230.

41

Chapter Three: Background Information and Historical Analysis
This chapter provides a brief review of the evolution of rape and sexual violence
under international humanitarian and international criminal law prior to its prosecution at
the ICTY. In addition to outlining the laws of war, this chapter analyzes some of the
provisions of those laws in an effort to offer a partial explanation as to why rape and
sexual violence were not prosecuted under international law prior to the tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Next, I note aspects of international human rights law
and international norms regarding sexual violence. The subsequent chapters demonstrate
the work of transnational human rights activism and the resulting prosecution of sexual
violence in international courts. To lead into these chapters, the final section of this
chapter will therefore briefly summarize the history of transnational human rights
activism.
Laws of War and International Humanitarian Law
In order to understand the evolution of the prohibition of wartime rape and sexual
violence, it is vital to understand some of the historical laws governing war. An
examination of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) reveals that the punishment of
rape in wartime is not a new decree in the laws of war. IHL refers to the rules,
regulations and laws that govern members of the armed forces and certain civilians
during periods of armed conflict.122
Often in times of conflict and war, throughout history and throughout all regions of
the world, rape has been given license, as a necessity for soldiers, as booty or as an
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instrument of policy.123 Prior to modern humanitarian law, a small number of laws of
war existed that forbid rape by soldiers, albeit such prohibitions were largely unenforced.
According to scholar Theodor Meron, national military codes of Richard II (1395) and
Henry V (1419) prohibited rape by soldiers and noted that violators could have been
subjected to capital punishment.124 However, it is doubtful that such provisions in
military codes considered the rights of women.
Gender expert and legal scholar, Patricia Viseur Sellers, has researched and
analyzed military codes of the 18th century in Europe, which had nominal provisions
prohibiting wartime sexual violence and rape against the “presumed innocent, persons
such as scholars, farmers, women, merchants, priests or children.”125 Although these
provisions existed in military codes, given the inferior status of women at the time, it can
be inferred that such provisions did not have an underlying condescension of rape. The
dignity and worth of women and children were not particularly taken into consideration.
Sellers notes that these prohibitions “ensured that non-military segments of society
remained functional.”126 Thus the prohibitions were established to attempt to ensure that
society still functioned in the midst of war and that soldiers did not disrupt the
productive, civilian aspects of society.
Despite the minimal disparagement of rape and sexual violence in the previously
mentioned military codes some military codes of conduct and laws of war slowly
progressed. In 1863 in the United States, a military code known as the “Lieber Code,”
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forbade “all rape” and declared that, “crimes … such as …rape … are punishable.”127
This may have been reflective of customary laws of war at the time, but it is uncertain
whether such a regulation was actually enforced. Nevertheless, the Lieber Code is part of
the initial stages of modern IHL.
Although the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 did not explicitly ban rape as a
war crime, it can be argued that aspects of the Conventions implied that the prohibition of
rape was a customary law of war.128 Article I of the Annex to the II Hague Convention
of 1899 and Article I of the IV Hague Convention of 1907, cautioned soldiers to “conduct
their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.”129 As was customary
at the time, rape was viewed as a violation of a family’s honor as opposed to a violation
of a woman’s body and spirit. The Hague Convention vaguely addresses this by noting
that during wartime and/or military occupation, “family honour…must be respected.”130
Therefore, the language of this legal instrument did not overtly condemn sexual violence.
Despite the aforementioned laws of war, IHL and more progressive regulations of
rape truly emerged with the Geneva Conventions. In fact, “humanitarian law” was
coined in the 1950s by the International Committee of the Red Cross to distinguish the
provisions of the Geneva Conventions from the general laws of war.131 The 1929 Geneva
Convention stipulated that “Prisoners of war have the right to have their person and their
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honour respected…women shall be treated with all the regard due to their sex.”132 The
Geneva Convention of 1949 and its Additional Protocols, state that women, children, and
the elderly are to be "especially protected" from inhumane treatment.133 Although rape is
not clearly noted, it is clear that rape would be considered a violation of dignity and
bodily integrity, and it could be classified as cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
Tokyo and Nuremburg Tribunals
There is adequate documentation that during World War II, Nazi and Japanese
soldiers committed acts of forced prostitution, rape, and other forms of sexual violence
on a massive scale.134 Despite customary laws of war, both the International Military
Tribunals for Tokyo and Nuremburg did not prosecute rape. Evidence of rape was
admitted to the tribunals, but in fact, rape was not named in either charter or charged as a
separate offence.135

Although rape was not formally recognized or prosecuted in Nuremburg, it was
listed as a crime against humanity in the Allied Local Council Law No. 10, under which
intermediate-ranking Nazi war criminals were prosecuted.136 Despite the fact that rape
was not charged as a separate offense in the Tokyo Tribunal, sexual violence was
acknowledged and convictions of such violence were included under the category of war
crimes of “murder, rape, and other cruelties.”137 It is important to note that rape was
acknowledged in Tokyo even though it was not given a separate and distinct charge.
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Additional Protocols
In 1977, the First and Second Additional Protocols to the Geneva Convention
provided more comprehensive prohibitions on rape and violations of personal dignity.
They provided an explicit prohibition of rape in international armed conflicts as well as in
armed conflicts not of an international character.138 The First Additional Protocol
specified that civilians and military agents are prohibited from inflicting, “outrages upon
personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, enforced prostitution
and any form of indecent assault.”139 The Protocol further stipulated that women are to
be protected from “rape, forced prostitution, and any other form of assault,” and that
children are to be protected from “indecent assault.”140
The Second Additional Protocol focuses on non-international armed conflict and
reiterates fundamental guarantees listed in the First Protocol. For example, it prohibits
“outrages against personal dignity, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent
assault” against persons who “do not take a direct part or have ceased to take part in
hostilities.”141 The expanded language in these Additional Protocols demonstrates how
customary law progressed relative to sexual violence and rape.
Direct and Indirect Criminal Responsibility
Despite the more explicit prohibitions regarding rape in the Additional Protocols of
the Geneva Convention of 1949, rape and other forms of sexual violence were not
pursued in international investigations and prosecutions. Sellers notes that this lack of
judicial redress was excused on grounds of the inability to identify physical perpetrators
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and the problem of charging a non-physical perpetrator responsible if he were a political
leader or military commander.142 However, with the evolution of customary law, it has
been found that the definitions of direct criminal responsibility and indirect criminal
responsibility can address the issue regarding who is responsible for perpetrating sexual
violence and who can be prosecuted for such atrocities. Direct responsibility implicates
any accused persons who have planned, instigated, committed, ordered, aided or abetted
the execution of crimes.143
Indirect criminal responsibility implicates liability to a person in a position of
superior authority, whether military, political, business, or any hierarchical status, for acts
directly committed by his or her subordinates.144 Indirect criminal responsibility is
particularly useful for prosecutions relative to armed conflict situations where there is a
chain of command or persons in higher positions of authority who may demand or be
complicit with acts of rape and sexual violence.
Human Rights Law and Women’s Rights
In addition to humanitarian law and laws of war, international human rights
standards also provide a legal framework from which to condemn and prosecute sexual
violence in conflict. Historically, human rights were seen primarily as domestic matters,
prohibiting the state from abusing its citizens, while humanitarian law sought to regulate
war and to prevent abuse, which exceeded the needs of war.145 Although the scope,
substance, and jurisdiction of humanitarian law differ from human rights law, it is
increasingly recognized as interconnected law.
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Rape and other forms of sexual violence deprive victims (women, men, and
children) of their human rights, in wartime and in peace. That being said, it is also a
human rights violation to deny equal access to justice. There are several human rights
laws and standards that address the human rights violations of sexual violence.
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW) and its General Recommendations has provisions, which specifically
address sexual violence. The first Article in CEDAW defines discrimination against
women as
“any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which
has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a
basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other
field.”146
In 1992, CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19 recognized that gender-based
violence, which infringes the enjoyment of women’s human rights and fundamental
freedoms under general international law or under human rights conventions, is
discrimination within the meaning of the first article of CEDAW.147 General
Recommendation 19 thus outlines that women and girls have the right to equal protection
under humanitarian norms and access to judicial redress for such violations.
Additional declarations and resolutions have increasingly contributed to expanding
international human rights norms and standards that condemn sexual violence in conflict.
The 1995 Beijing Platform for Action acknowledged that rape in armed conflict is an
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“abhorrent practice.”148 The Platform further noted that such practices are violations of
human rights and IHL. In 2000, Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace,
and Security specified the “need to implement fully, international humanitarian and
human rights law that protects the rights of women and girls during and after conflicts”
and called “upon all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women
and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual
abuse.”149 In 2008 the Security Council passed resolution 1820, which noted that, sexual
violence is used sometimes as a tactic of war and that women and girls are particularly
targeted.150 The resolution further noted the need to address sexual violence in conflict.
Brief History of Transnational Human Rights Activism
Humanitarian and human rights laws and human rights activism have evolved and
merged in the past two decades. Just as taking note of the historical and legal
background of IHL and human rights law is important for understanding the nuances of
sexual violence prosecution at the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC, it is also important to briefly
outline the history of transnational human rights activism and women’s rights activism.
According to Schmidt and Rodio, adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) in 1948 marked the beginning of the modern era of transnational human
rights activism.151 The UDHR has been a foundation for legally binding and “soft”
human rights law. In addition, it has been a cornerstone document for the principles of
human rights activists, NGOs, and intergovernmental organizations. The activism around
148
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the time of the adoption of the UDHR overwhelmingly depended on the individual
capacities of norm entrepreneurs and their close ties to policymakers.152 A prime
example of such individual activism of an influential figure is Eleanor Roosevelt, who
was heavily involved in drafting the UDHR.
In the 1960s and 1970s, transnational human rights activism began to involve more
people, regardless of individual capacities or personal influence on policymakers. The
activism at this time sought to be independent and non-partisan in an attempt to reveal
states’ poor implementation of human rights norms. The ensuing Cold War gave states
different priorities, which reasserted their sovereignty.153 The focus of the UN at the
height of the Cold War was on ensuring peace and security and there was less emphasis
on promoting human rights norms. During this period, human rights NGOs began to
grow in prominence and they began to utilize various methods for trying to exert pressure
on states. During the 1970s, with de-colonization and some easing of Cold War tensions,
human rights organizations focused more attention on the UN.154 Human rights
organizations were starting to issue their reports on human rights issues to the UN human
rights bodies as a form of activism.
With little movement in the UN, NGOs developed a new strategy that focused on
individual countries, the development of sustained transnational ties between local
activists and international NGOs, and the systematic gathering, investigating, and
publication of human rights information.155 Organizations such as Amnesty International
and Human Rights Watch gained legitimacy through their human rights research and
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investigations. Their reports and publications became trusted sources of information,
which has been central to their identity and style of activism. With these honed strategies
of large human rights NGOs, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch became
leaders in the field. As their strategies continue to evolve, there are a plethora of other
human rights advocacy organizations at the international and domestic levels that
collaborate and model similar strategies of information gathering, policy lobbying, and
report writing.
By the 1990s, transnational human rights activism began focusing on specific
thematic issues and campaigns in addition to specific country and regional reporting.156
International human rights organizations, like Human Rights Watch, established thematic
divisions for women’s rights, and specific women’s rights organizations formed at the
international and local levels.
An example of thematic campaigning is of the campaign to eliminate violence
against women. Such campaigning included the same principles and older strategies of
previous transnational human rights activism, while also generating more attention
towards international justice and ending impunity for gross human rights violations. A
specific thematic issue under the umbrella of the campaign to eliminate violence against
women and ending impunity was the push to prosecute conflict-related sexual violence in
international criminal tribunals and courts. The work of transnational human rights
activists to influence the prosecution of sexual violence in international courts will be
discussed in the subsequent chapters.
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Chapter Four: The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
This chapter offers a synopsis and assessment of the influence and interaction that
transnational human rights advocacy networks had with the ICTY. The chapter begins
with a brief overview and description of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and acts of
sexual violence in the conflict. I will also describe the formation and jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, as well as advocacy network involvement regarding prosecution of sexual
violence. I then analyze how advocacy networks have contributed to the prosecution of
conflict-related sexual violence at the Tribunal by looking at the strategies utilized and
dynamics of the networks.
Historical Context
Bosnia-Herzegovina arose as a sovereign state out of the collapse of totalitarian
control in the former Yugoslavia. The political vacuum left room for intense conflict
over territory among competing ethnic groups. Through political elections in the early
1990s, Bosnia became divided along ethnic nationalist lines. These factors, as well as the
decline in economic conditions began to play a role in festering nationalist and ethnic
extremism. Bosnian president, Alija Izetbegovic, led the Party for Democratic Action
(SDA), which was a predominately Muslim party. Further enraged by the Muslim
majority leadership, Bosnian-Serb leader, Rodovan Karadzic, began rallying BosnianSerbs. Under direct collaboration, assistance, and influence from Belgrade, Bosnian-Serb
paramilitary forces began military operations in Bosnia in April of 1992, soon after the
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day Bosnia-Herzegovina’s independence was recognized by the international
community.157
Bosnian-Croat paramilitary forces, under the influence and assistance of Croatia,
also began its campaign of overtaking Bosnian territory through ethnic cleansing. Serbian
and Croatian forces aimed to not only expel the ethnically “unclean” population from the
desired territory, but also to destroy all possibilities for their return by instilling fear and
demolishing buildings, bridges, and monuments.158 The war in Bosnia consisted of
highly discriminate massacres in which military male age civilians were separated from
women, children and elderly, and tortured, forced into labor, or killed. Political and
cultural elite were publicly tortured and executed, women and children were forced to
flee, and younger women were raped.159
Through a campaign of systematic ethnic cleansing, Bosnian-Serbs and BosnianCroats wanted to break up Bosnia and link areas, which contained their ethnic majorities
to the larger entities of Serbia and Croatia. Bosnian Muslims, fought to retain a unified
Bosnian state, a state that would include the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, but
which would give the Muslims enhanced control of the government due to their relative
population strength.160 Although the Bosnian-Serbs initiated the conflict and ethnic
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cleansing, Croatian Army and Bosnian government army offensives also perpetrated
grave human rights violations in the conflict.161
From 1992 to 1995, approximately 250,000 people died or went missing in the
conflict in the former Yugoslavia and millions were displaced, raped, tortured, and
detained in concentration camps.162 These deaths and displacements were not merely
incidental. In fact, during the war, civilians were deliberately targeted for massive forced
removal, murder, rape, and other atrocities.163
Sexual Violence in the Conflict
As previously mentioned, rape and other forms of sexual violence were used as
tools of war and as elements of a systematic campaign to form ethnically homogenous
territories. There have been estimates that approximately 20,000 women and girls were
raped during the conflict, and oftentimes in particularly sadistic and humiliating ways
that included mutilation, gang rape, and public rape.164 Rape, sexual enslavement, and
forced impregnation and maternity occurred where women and girls were forcibly
enslaved in abandoned schools, sports centers, and cafes to be continually raped.165
Many women and young girls also died as a result of sexual injuries or mutilation. Boys
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and men were also victims of sexual violence that was meant to cause extreme
humiliation and mutilation.
Women’s Rights Advocacy and the Formation of the ICTY
In addition to the increase of human rights advocacy network campaigns
operating in world politics since the 1970s, specific campaigns for gender justice and
women’s rights had been mobilizing and activists had been gathering a wealth of
experience in international politics leading up to the formation of the ICTY. These
campaigns for women’s rights merged with the larger framework of transnational human
rights advocacy and drew upon their tactics and strategies. Violence against women
became a specific topic for transnational human rights networks in the early 1980s and by
the 1990s, the issue developed rapidly and became one of the most important women’s
rights issues, as well as a major concern for international human rights.166 The increased
awareness of the topic of violence against women in the international community, the
issues of sexual violence in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and the UN’s interest
in establishing a tribunal were therefore timely for advocacy networks to campaign for
the prosecution of sexual violence at the ICTY.
As evidence began to mount and media reports unveiled the heinous human rights
violations during the conflict, the international community decided to establish a tribunal
to prosecute those persons most responsible for grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, violations of laws or customs of war, genocide, and crimes against
humanity. Transnational human rights advocacy networks were involved at the
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beginning stages of forming such a tribunal, which I argue played a role in the leverage
that they had in encouraging the prosecution of sexual violence. The UN Office for
Legal Affairs sought comments and recommendations from member states and human
rights NGOs prior to drafting the Statute of the ICTY in 1993.167 The Security Council
approved the Statute on May 25, 1993, as Resolution 827.168
In addition to making recommendations for the Statute to include specific
criminalization for sexual violence, women’s and human rights organizations also urged
the Tribunal to adopt rules and procedures that would enable successful sexual violence
prosecution.169 In fact, legal scholars and students of the International Women’s Human
Rights Law Clinic of CUNY Law School and the Harvard Law School Human Rights
Program submitted a brief recommending rules and procedures to the ICTY regarding
sexual violence crimes.170 Some of the rules that they recommended were adopted,
including those regarding protection of victims and witnesses, the creation of a victim
and witnesses unit, and guidelines for rules of evidence in cases of sexual assault. The
rules regarding evidentiary rules for crimes of sexual violence were directly derived from
the proposed rules of the two law school programs.171 This supports my hypothesis that
large and well-established organizations and coalitions within advocacy networks have
played a key role.
In submitting recommendations and comments during the drafting process for the
Statute, many larger human rights and women’s rights NGOs, who had access and
167
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experience with the UN system and knowledge of international humanitarian law,
demanded that rape be explicitly listed as a crime against humanity.172 As a result, article
five of the Statute lists rape as a crime against humanity in armed conflict.173 Advocates
also played a role in the ICTY incorporation of an expanded notion of liability and
criminal responsibility for rape and sexual violence.174 The Statute specified that
individual liability may be imposed on any person who “planned, instigated, ordered,
committed, or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation, or execution of a
crime.”175
Once the ICTY was officially formed, advocacy networks played various roles in
ensuring that the recognition of sexual violence in the Statute would be implemented in
court proceedings. There had already been a solid foundation of active women’s rights
NGOs in the former Yugoslavia. These domestic NGOs played a role in identifying and
supporting witnesses of the ICTY, as well as counseling survivors.176 Domestic NGOs
had also been active during the war, documenting abuses and gathering evidence related
to crimes of sexual violence. They were therefore able to inform the ICTY of the
pervasiveness of sexual violence during the conflict as well as assist in investigatory
procedures.
In addition to this role of local NGOs, the success of prosecuting sexual violence
depended heavily on the strategies and tactics of international NGOs. International
women’s rights and human rights organizations, such as the Feminist Majority, Women’s
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Action Coalition, the Center for Women’s Global Leadership, and the Center for
Reproductive Policy and Law, formed the Ad Hoc Women’s Coalition Against War
Crimes in the former Yugoslavia to pressure to bring awareness of sexual violence to the
ICTY and to pressure the Tribunal to prosecute such crimes.177 These NGOs exerted
pressure on judges and prosecutors to raise awareness regarding crimes of sexual
violence and to ensure that these crimes were prioritized.178 They worked to ensure that
gender expertise was present throughout the organization of the ICTY.
This pressure made through information politics, symbolic politics, media articles,
briefings, direct legal intervention with amicus briefs, letter writing, and in-person
meetings made the initial chief prosecutor, Richard Goldstone, specifically aware of the
need to have gender expertise at the ICTY to ensure the prosecution of sexual violence.
Goldstone appointed Patricia Sellers as “Legal Advisor for Gender-Related Crimes” to
the Office of the Prosecution to formulate a prosecution approach to rape and other sex
crimes at the ICTY (and the ICTR).179 Although it is unclear whether this appointment
was a direct result of the efforts of advocacy network pressure, it can be inferred that
advocacy campaigns for prosecuting sexual violence did help generate the political will
to implement gender-sensitive procedures and tools for the Tribunal. In fact, Goldstone
himself noted in written statements that he faced an immediate pressure from advocacy
groups to address crimes of sexual violence.180
Prosecution and Conviction for Sexual Violence at the ICTY
Although this thesis cannot describe every single conviction at the ICTY, it is
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important to highlight a significant conviction at the Tribunal and note how legal scholars
and professionals within advocacy networks were able to exert influence. A form of
direct and formal intervention in tribunal cases is made through the submission of amicus
curiae or “friend of the court” briefs. The trial of Duško Tadić reveals how professionals
working within advocacy networks were able to exert such direct and formal pressure on
the Tribunal. Tadić was a Bosnian Serb who participated in the killing and mistreatment
of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in the Omarska, Trnopolje and Keraterm
detention camps.181 The female and male prisoners in these camps were beaten, tortured,
raped, sexually assaulted, and sexually mutilated.
Initially, the prosecutors for the Tadić trial filed an affidavit that treated the rape
of women in Omarska prison as background matter, while emphasizing the beatings of
male prisoners.182 The CUNY Law School Clinic of International Human Rights, the
Blaustein Institute, and the Harvard Human Rights Program filed an amicus brief, which
emphasized the failure to treat rape as an indictable offense, therefore bringing attention
to the issue.183 In situations like these, legal scholars were able to use their professional
experience and legal knowledge for the campaign to prosecute sexual violence. This type
of activity informed judges, prosecutors, and other staff working for the Tribunal that the
advocacy campaign was professional and highly targeted.
In response to the amicus brief that was submitted, a motion that addressed the rape
of female prisoners was granted.184Tadić was charged and indicted on counts of crimes
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against humanity (persecution on political, racial, and or religious grounds), for taking
part in a campaign of terror, which included killings, torture, sexual assaults, and other
physical and psychological abuse and for his participation in the “torture of more than 12
female detainees, including several gang rapes.”185 He was charged and indicted on
counts that he had subjected a woman to forcible sexual intercourse under crimes against
humanity (rape). Tadić was charged with a grave breach (inhumane treatment) violation
of the laws or customs of war (cruel treatment) for his participation in acts of sexual
violence and sexual mutilation. Although there had been insufficient evidence that Tadić
himself had committed sexual violence, evidence did establish that sexual violence was
pervasive and rampant, therefore Tadić was convicted of aiding and abetting crimes of
physical, mental and sexual violence through continued and knowing participation in, or
tacit encouragement of, these crimes.186
These convictions demonstrate that the submission of amicus briefs was a specific
tactic that was helpful for sustaining pressure on the court. Two amicus briefs were also
filed by women’s and human rights groups in the Tadic case to support witness protection
measures and two more were filed in the Anto Furundzija case to counter the defense
lawyer ’s claim that the rape victim’s condition of post-traumatic stress disorder limited
the credibility of her testimony.187 In 1998, the ICTY convicted Anto Furundzija, a
Special Forces commander, for rape and torture as war crimes. In this case, a witness
described how she was arrested and held at the Special Forces barracks where, during an
interrogation led by the Furundzija and another perpetrator, she was subjected to public
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rape and threats of sexual mutilations.188 The trial chamber held that the elements of rape
were: “(i) the sexual penetration, however slight: of the vagina or anus of the victim by
the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or of the mouth of
the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; (ii) by coercion or force or threat of force
against a victim or third person.189 The conviction further underlined the non-consent of
the victim by stating that “any form of captivity vitiated consent.”190
ICTY Indictments and Convictions of Rape/Sexual Assault
Information listed below is current as of July 2011. Since the Tribunal started, 78
individuals, 48% of the 161 accused, had charges of sexual violence included in their
indictments.
Convictions

28

Withdrawn Indictments or Accused Deceased Before Trial

13

Individuals Acquitted of Sexual Violence Charges

11

Individuals in Ongoing Proceedings

20

Individuals Referred to a National Jurisdiction

6

Source: International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(http://www.icty.org/sid/10586)
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Implications and Limitations of Sexual Violence Prosecution
Although there is wide recognition among human rights and women’s rights
advocacy organizations that the prosecutions of sexual violence at the ICTY was a step
forward, there are also several aspects of the prosecutions that scholars and activists have
reflected as being regressive. First, the recognition of rape as a crime against humanity
has not been interpreted as an absolute prohibition against the act of rape in war. The
Tribunal did not condemn rape and sexual violence as acts, which exceed a reasonably
necessary and proportional level of violence in all circumstances of armed conflict.191
Even though the listing of rape and sexual violence as a crime against humanity addresses
the fact that such acts are a violation of basic human rights, the crimes against humanity
provision limits the condemnation of sexual violence in war. The implications are that
the ICTY is not a confirmation of absolute prohibitions against sexual violence in war,
therefore not providing full recognition and resources to investigating and prosecuting
such atrocities.192
Second, while rape in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia garnered attention in
the international community, the attention was due to the perception that rape was an
attack on ethnicity or genocidal.193 The use of symbolic politics and the media in the
transnational advocacy campaign to end impunity for conflict-related sexual violence in
the former Yugoslavia emphasized rape as a tool of ethnic cleansing. Although rape was
used as a tool to ethnically cleanse territories in the former Yugoslavia, the perspective of
sexual violence was oversimplified and failed to acknowledge the numerous acts of
191
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sexual violence that were attacks on women, men, and children’s worth and human
dignity.

Even though this characterization of rape helped contribute to its overall

condemnation and prosecution, the characterization deflected from the issue of sexual
violence in war and the fact that women and girls are predominantly victims of sexual
violence in war. Rhonda Copelan, who was a co-founder and professor for the CUNY
Law School’s International Women’s Human Rights Clinic, has reflected that the
characterization of rape being a “weapon of war” for genocide, had a potentially
regressive aspect in suggesting that this use of rape was qualitatively different from the
traditional use of women as booty.194
Analysis of Advocacy Networks
Understanding the dynamics and strategies of the transnational advocacy network
and prosecutorial outcomes is important for understanding the effect and influence that
advocacy networks have had on the ICTY. Obviously, geopolitical factors, media
attention, and symbolic framing all set the stage for transnational advocacy to influence
the ICTY to address conflict-related sexual violence.195 However, the professional
presence of NGOs and coalitions and their information politics, expertise, and direct
forms of legal pressure all had unequivocal influence in the prosecution and ultimate
convictions related to sexual violence. While it is more ambiguous what the
prosecutorial outcomes would have been without this specific transnational advocacy
network campaign to prosecute sexual violence, the campaign undoubtedly influenced
legal norms and bolstered the political will to investigate and prosecute sexual violence.
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The work of local NGOs to provide their own investigative findings, provide
victim/witnesses, support victim/witnesses, and counsel victim/witnesses demonstrated to
the Tribunal that even small, domestic NGOs had a certain level of professionalization
and expertise on the subject of sexual violence. It is clear that the information that
domestic NGOs had about rape and sexual violence during the conflict was shared with
international NGOs and coalitions in an effort to work towards a common goal of
prosecution. This collaboration strengthened the campaign internally and also assisted
the campaign to be perceived from the Tribunal as highly organized and professional.
The receptiveness of the Tribunal’s judges, prosecutors, and staff of NGO
participation and recommendations allowed NGOs to gain significant leverage and
embed their principles into the prosecution unit. The multifaceted strategies that NGOs
and coalitions employed, including recommendations for the Statute, rules and
procedures, being an intermediary for victims/witnesses, and filing direct amicus briefs,
further demonstrated the legitimacy of the campaign and the high degree to which
organizations were part of the prosecution of sexual violence at the ICTY. The
participation of the CUNY law school and Harvard law school legal scholars was pivotal
for further legitimizing and professionalizing the campaign. The work of Ad Hoc
Women’s Coalition Against War Crimes in the former Yugoslavia in encouraging and
providing gender expertise through all aspects of the ICTY organization was also
significant. In addition, the expertise that human rights legal scholars were able to insert
into the Tribunal’s rules and procedures unmistakably set a precedent for NGO and
human rights coalitions to be recognized not only as experts, but an informal authority on
prosecutorial procedures.
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Chapter Five: The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Like the previous chapter, this chapter offers a synopsis and assessment of the
influence and interaction that transnational human rights advocacy networks had with the
ICTR. The chapter opens with a concise historical background and summary of the
genocide in Rwanda that took place in 1994. Included in this summary will be an
overview of the extensive and systematic acts of sexual violence. Following this
background information, I will review the establishment of the ICTR and the role that
advocacy networks played in the inclusion of sexual violence in the jurisdiction of the
tribunal. Next I describe and analyze how advocacy networks contributed to the
investigation and prosecution sexual violence at the ICTR, by combing through specific
events in the landmark Akayesu case. I will highlight the professional advocacy methods
and tools that activists, lawyers, and researchers used, as well as specific internal
dynamics of NGOs as they advocated for sexual violence prosecution at the tribunal.
Historical Context of the Conflict
A swift and massive genocidal campaign took place in Rwanda in 1994, which
was organized by political leaders and extremists and carried out by military, militiamen,
police, and civilians. Although the exact figures of those who were killed during the
1994 Rwandan genocide are difficult to determine, it is estimated that approximately
500,000 to one million Rwandan men, women, and children were murdered from April to
July 1994.196 Those who were murdered were primarily Tutsi minorities and moderate
Hutus.
The Tutsi ethnic group in Rwanda was favored during colonialism and therefore
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held control in Rwandan politics. When Rwanda gained independence in 1962, Hutus
seized power, which incited approximately half the Tutsi population to flee to
neighboring countries.197 Although conflict continued between Tutsi refugees and Hutus
following independence, the decade leading up to 1990 was relatively stable. However,
in 1990 expatriate rebel forces of Tutsi refugees (the Rwandan Patriotic Army) invaded
northern Rwanda.198 President Juvenal Habyarimana was the president of Rwanda and
had governed since 1973.199 Although Habyarmana bowed to pressure sign the peaceful
Arusha Accords in 1993 he had already established a massive campaign against all Tutsi
and Hutus who allied with them and he was able to block full implementation of the
Accord. This campaign included propaganda through written press and radio,
organization of militia, and distribution of arms.200

On April 6, 1994, Habyarimana's plane was shot down, which spurred
Habyarimana supporters and Hutu extremists to blame the RPF and civilian Tutsi for his
death.201 Immediately following Habyarimana’s death, plans for genocide were
effectively and easily executed as they built upon Habyarimana’s propaganda campaign.
National and local authorities, political and military leaders, and militias led and fully
implemented efforts to attack Tutsis and moderate Hutus.

As Hutus began to attack and murder Tutsi, the majority of Tutsi sought refuge
and congregated in central gathering places such as churches, schools, hospitals, athletic
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fields, and stadiums.202 Military, police, and militia surrounded such sites and killed
those inside. Within two weeks, approximately 250,000 Tutsis were murdered.203 With
limited media reports, scant international pressure, and a weak and ineffective
peacekeeping force, most of the killing of Tutsis occurred within three weeks and a
slower rate of killing dragged on for two and a half months.204

Sexual Violence in the Conflict

As briefly noted above, there was limited accurate or reliable news sources on the
genocide and ultimately, it was large international NGOs such as Human Rights Watch,
African Rights, and the Red Cross who had actually documented information and
reported on the genocide.205 During the genocide, sexual violence was widespread and
systematic. Human Rights Watch led investigations into the pervasiveness of sexual
violence during the genocide and published a report, which revealed that militia groups,
soldiers, and civilians perpetrated sexual violence. The report noted that, “rape and other
forms of violence were directed primarily against Tutsi women because of both their
gender and their ethnicity.”206
Although precise figures of the number of women and girls who were raped is
unclear, it is estimated that tens of thousands of women were subjected to extremely
violent forms of sexual violence. Women and girls were individually raped, gang-raped,
raped with objects such as sharpened sticks or gun barrels, held in sexual slavery, and/or
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sexually mutilated with machetes, knives, sticks, boiling water, and or acid.207 While
many women and girls were killed immediately after being raped and or sexually
mutilated, some women were held in sexual slavery and some women were able to flee
only to face sexual violence repeatedly from different militiamen. For some women who
were not killed following rape and sexual mutilation, the sexual violence caused severe
bleeding and additional medical complications, which resulted in their deaths.
Formation of the ICTR
The advocacy of women’s rights organizations and coalitions during the
formation of the ICTY and the writing of the ICTY statute had a far reaching impact as
the statute for the ICTR specified rape as a crime against humanity in article three.208
The statute of the ICTR was adopted by Security Council resolution 955 in November of
1994 and was established to investigate and prosecute war crimes, genocide, and crimes
against humanity that took place in Rwanda between January 1, 1994, and December 31,
1994.209 In addition to listing rape as a crime against humanity, the statute gave the
Tribunal the authority to prosecute persons committing or ordering to be committed
serious violations of article three common to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949
for the Protection of War Victims, and of Additional Protocol II of 1997.210 These
violations include, “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault.”211
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Despite specific and clear language regarding sexual violence in the statute, the
formation of the ICTR and initial investigations did not place emphasis or priority on the
issue. The Commission of Experts in Rwanda had a four-month mandate and started its
work in July 1994. Unlike the Commission of Experts for Yuguslavia, the Commission
for Rwanda did not devote much of its investigations into rape and sexual violence. 212 In
fact, the report failed to mention any instances of rape and sexual violence as part of the
genocide in Rwanda.213 In addition to this failing, advocacy networks did not really start
to mobilize advocacy campaigns and pressure the Tribunal regarding sexual violence
prosecutions until 1996. While there are various arguments as to why advocacy networks
did not mobilize as quickly and efficiently as they did at the beginning of ICTY’s
existence, it is clear that all of the progress made regarding sexual violence prosecutions
at the ICTY did not automatically transfer to the ICTR. The strategies that advocacy
networks used at the ICTR were therefore not always evolved techniques and tools that
were used at the ICTY. With that being noted however, I argue that major international
human rights organizations and coalitions of professionals were essential to the progress
made at the ICTR regarding sexual violence prosecutions.
Prosecutorial Strategy at the ICTR
In addition to the inadequate investigations of the Commission of Experts for
Rwanda, the overall investigative and prosecutorial strategy for the Prosecution Office at
the ICTR did not place a strong emphasis on sexual violence. Furthermore, the political
will of the prosecution unit to aggressively investigate and prosecute sexual violence and
establish gender-sensitive policies was inconsistent. Advocacy groups therefore had to
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respond to the inconsistent political will and weak prosecutorial strategies of the ICTR
with detailed research reports and expertise as advocacy tools.
Although the first prosecutor for the ICTR, Richard Goldstone, appointed a Legal
Advisor for gender-related crimes for both the ICTY and the ICTR, the position was
located in the Hague and the Advisor’s influence on the ICTR was therefore quite
limited.214 Investigators did not receive extensive trainings on sexual violence and the
investigative team had the general attitude that “women don’t talk about these things.”215
Goldstone did not establish a sexual assault unit of the investigative team of the Office of
the Prosecutor until the end of his tenure in 1996.216 A witness protection program was
not created until 1997, which also significantly contributed to the poor prosecutorial
strategy of the ICTR regarding sexual violence.217 In fact, in the three years that
Goldstone was the chief prosecutor of the ICTR, no rape indictments occurred and rape
was simply not included in the general prosecutorial strategy of the tribunal.218
The second prosecutor of the ICTR, Louise Arbour, placed more emphasis on
collecting sexual violence evidence and 100 percent of the cases that came into the court
during her tenure included sexual violence charges.219 Although Arbour established a
stronger stance on investigating and prosecuting sexual violence, the third chief
prosecutor, Carla del Ponte, who was appointed in 2000, had little commitment to the
issue of sexual violence. She dismantled the sexual assault unit and did not reinstate the
unit until she was seeking a second term and faced pressure from women’s rights
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groups.220 Even if charges of rape had been put forward in some of the indictments during
Carla del Ponte’s tenure, they were often dismissed due to insufficient evidence.221 Once
the investigation team dealing with sexual crimes was disbanded, the proportion of new
indictments including sexual violence charges dropped from 100 per cent in 1999 and
2000 to 35 percent in 2001 and 2002.222 By Del Ponte's final year as Chief Prosecutor,
none of the new indictments contained rape charges.
Funding and Administration
In addition to the general prosecutorial differences for the ICTY and the ICTR,
there were also gross funding and administrative differences, which may have impacted
the inconsistent and weak stance that the ICTR had regarding sexual violence
prosecution. Although the professionals interviewed for this thesis pointed to lack of
political will, none of them mentioned funding and administrative deficiencies for the
ICTR as a possible explanation. Within the first few years of operation, the ICTY
received $75 million, compared to the ICTR, which received $42 million. 223 An audit
report of the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services in 1997 detailed large
shortcomings in all areas of the ICTR. These deficiencies included incomplete and
unreliable financial records, payroll problems, under-qualified staff and staff vacancies,
inadequate security and witness protection, and lack of leadership.224
Transnational Advocacy Network Mobilization
As previously mentioned in this chapter, transnational advocacy networks did not
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really start to mobilize around sexual violence prosecution at the ICTR until 1996. This
may be because initially, human rights advocacy organizations assumed that the gains
made at the ICTY regarding sexual violence would travel to the ICTR, especially given
that both tribunals shared the same Chief Prosecutor.225 An additional and crucial factor
that contributed to the delay in advocacy mobilization for the ICTR laid in the fact that
there was uneven media attention given to the genocide in Rwanda compared to the
conflict in the former Yugoslavia.226 In reality, the conflict in Rwanda was not in the
sphere of interest of the mainstream media.227 Furthermore, local women’s organizations
in Rwanda did not have deep connections with large international organizations and they
did not have issue alignment over the prioritization of sexual violence justice.228 As a
result of all the aforementioned factors, transnational advocacy network campaigning was
severely delayed and it did not gather the strength and momentum to gain widespread
awareness on the issue of sexual violence to profoundly influence the ICTR.
In 1996, Human Rights Watch researchers Binaifer Nowrojee and Janet Fleishman
traveled to Rwanda conduct research and investigations into sexual violence that
occurred during the genocide.229 Human Rights Watch then published Nowrojee and
Fleishman’s work in a report titled “Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the
Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath,” which revealed that sexual violence was
systematic and widespread during the genocide. “Shattered Lives” was the first report
available to the public that documented the widespread nature of sexual violence in
Rwanda and it therefore became an advocacy tool that helped to mobilize transnational
225
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human rights advocacy networks.230
According to Nowrojee, the report was “the starting point for a whole campaign to
bring this issue to the attention of policy maker’s and women’s rights groups.”231 As part
of the advocacy campaign, Nowrojee collaborated with local organizations, large
international organizations like International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), and
broad-based coalitions of feminist lawyers and scholars such as the Coalition for
Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations.
In fact, the Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations was formed
following the publishing of “Shattered Lives.” Co-founder of the Coalition for Women’s
Human Rights in Conflict Situations (the Coalition), Ariane Brunet, collaborated with
Human Rights Watch and the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic
Development in Montreal, soon after “Shattered Lives” was published to form the
Coalition. Within a year and a half, Brunet networked and got a variety of actors to be
part of the Coalition. These actors include; students from the University of Toronto Law
School, Berkley Human Rights Center, the Working group on Engendering the Rwanda
Tribunal, CUNY Women’s International Human Rights Law Clinic, Africa Rights
Watch, the Center for Constitutional Rights, FIDH, individual lawyers, legal scholars,
individual activists, numerous NGOs based in Kenya and Rwanda, and additional
international NGOs.232
Following this collaboration and networking, Nowrojee and other activists within
the Coalition then held meetings with government officials, the Rwandan government,
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humanitarian groups, and prosecutors at the ICTR to gain widespread awareness of the
issue and discuss recommendations which could be implemented for different actors,
including the Prosecution Office at the ICTR. In addition to these meetings, activists
began to closely follow, document, analyze, and critique the proceedings of Tribunal. As
with the ICTY, advocacy networks established and introduced their advocacy with the
ICTR by writing letters to the court and submitting amicus briefs voicing their concerns
over the lack of attention paid to prosecuting sexual violence.
Another strategy and advocacy tool that Nowrojee used was sharing information
from her investigations and providing her expertise on the issue of sexual violence during
the Rwandan genocide with the prosecution team. Nowrojee not only shared information
and took the stand as an expert witness regarding sexual violence during several trials,
but she also provided trainings to investigators and prosecutors on investigating sexual
violence. In an interview for this thesis Nowrojee stated, “So it wasn’t just a matter of
criticizing and pointing out the short falls, but also trying to constructively assist the
Prosecutor’s Office in terms of looking at the evidence, looking at their witness
statements, and serving as an expert witness in some of the trials.”233 Other activists
from the Coalition, such as Dr. Alison Des Forges of the Africa Regional Division of
Human Rights Watch, also served as expert witnesses for trials.234
Despite the fact that Nowrojee and other expert activists were able to share
information, provide trainings, and serve as expert witnesses in trials, these actions did
not happen immediately. Initial advocacy strategies of letter writing and direct meetings
following the publishing of “Shattered Lives” did not provoke a significant or immediate
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response from the prosecution to more aggressively investigate and prosecute sexual
violence. The newly developed strategy of the Coalition was to work directly with legal
students both in Toronto and at CUNY to closely zero in on a particular case, which was
the Jean Paul Akayesu case.235 A deeper look into the Akayesu case provides significant
insight into the dynamics of how transnational advocacy organizations interacted with
and pressured the ICTR to include sexual violence indictments in both the Akayesu case
and proceeding cases.
Jean Paul Akayesu Case
Although the overall prosecution of sexual violence at the ICTR was weak and
inconsistent, the case of Jean Paul Akayesu was a milestone that recognized sexual
violence as an integral part of the genocide, recognized rape as a form of torture,
broadened the definition of rape and sexual violence, and prosecuted rape and other
forms of sexual violence as genocide and crimes against humanity.236 An examination of
the Akayesu case is crucial for this chapter as the successful prosecution of the case is
rather reflective of the overall prosecution strategy of the ICTR and the direct pressure
that advocacy groups placed on the court.
Jean Paul Akayesu was the mayor of the Taba commune during the genocide.
Akayesu served an executive role in the commune as mayor and was in charge of
communal police and gendarmes at the commune. During the genocide, many Tutsis
sought refuge from the massacres in the Taba municipal offices only to be subject to
various forms of violence, including sexual violence, and/or murder.237
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Before describing specific details and events of the Akayesu trial, it is important
to note that prior to the trial, Binaifer Nowrojee had informed the prosecution that there
were masses of cases of sexual violence at the Taba commune by sharing information
that she had gathered in her investigations.238 With that preface noted, the initial 12
indictments of the Akayesu case did not include rape or sexual violence and those
indictments were not added until five months into the trail.239 According to Sara
Darehshori, who served as a prosecutor at the ICTR during the Akayesu trial, the
Prosecutor’s Office did not have direct evidence linking Akayesu to the sexual violence
that occurred in his commune. In addition, the evidence that Human Rights Watch
provided to the prosecution only indicated that sexual violence took place and did not
indicate that Akayesu was a perpetrator of sexual violence, nor did it prove that people
under Akayesu’s direct control were committing acts of sexual violence.240
Furthermore, Darehshori noted that when the prosecution prepared a witness for
trial, she said that she was raped, she witnessed other rapes in the area of the commune
municipal office, and that Akayesu was present during the rapes.241 Moreover, the
witness told prosecutors that she knew names of perpetrators, victims of the rapes, and
eyewitnesses who could provide testimony.242 The prosecution then started to pursue an
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investigation with these eyewitnesses while the witness who they prepped, revealed in
direct testimony in court, what she witnessed.243
Directly following this courtroom testimony, in July 1997, the Working Group on
Engendering the Rwanda Tribunal, the International Women's Human Rights Law Clinic
of CUNY Law School, the Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations,
and the Center for Constitutional Rights, filed an amicus curiae brief.244 The amicus brief
was signed by over 160 NGOs and requested the inclusion of sexual violence charges by
arguing that there was evidence that sexual violence was used systematically in the
genocide and could be prosecuted under several articles in the ICTR statute.
While the courtroom testimony and the amicus brief were quickly ensued by an
adjournment of the trial in order for the prosecution to amend the indictment to include
sexual violence charges, there has been debate as to whether this was the influence of the
amicus brief. The prosecutor stated that the amendment was not motivated by the amicus
brief.245 In fact, Darehshori noted in her interview for this thesis that those who
submitted the brief did not follow the technical court procedure to file a motion in which
you request to file an amicus brief and it was therefore not considered by the court.246
From the perspective of the prosecutor’s office, the amicus brief put the trial at risk
because it was unclear whether the testimony in the brief was direct testimony based on
eyewitnesses. The brief could have been further damaging because the defense did not
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have the ability to cross-examine testimonies therein.247 Ultimately, the brief was not
accepted by the court due to technical errors and because it came too late in the trial.248
Regardless of these technical mistakes and the fact that the brief was not accepted
by the court, NGOs created press releases and there turned out to be a significant amount
of media attention drawn to the issue with the submission of the amicus brief.249 This
attracted increased international attention to the systemic use of sexual violence in the
genocide and the status of prosecuting such crimes at the ICTR. Given the media
attention and public awareness that was generated through advocacy efforts, it is clear
that advocacy networks played an influential role in pressuring the prosecution and
encouraging them to thoroughly investigate leads regarding sexual violence and to
include sexual violence indictments.
Following investigation, the trial progressed with additional testimonies and
evidence used to verify that sexual violence was intrinsic to the genocide and that
Akayesu was criminally responsible. The prosecution successfully substantiated
allegations that Akayesu facilitated the commission of sexual violence by allowing the
sexual violence to occur on or near the Taba commune and he encouraged these acts by
failing to prevent them.250 Akayesu was charged with rape and inhumane acts as crimes
against humanity; outrages upon personal dignity as a war crime, and, sexual violence in

247

Sara Darehshori interview.
Gaëlle Breon Le Goff. Interview by Jessica Welker. Taped recording over the phone. April 2, 2012.
Transcript available in Appendix II.
ICTR, "Decision on the application to file an amicus curiae brief according to rule 74 of the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence filed on behalf of the NGO Coalition for Women's Human Rights in Conflict
Situations," Accessed on July 7, 2012. http://www.ictr.org/.
249
Gaëlle Breton-Le Goff, “Analysis of Trends of Sexual Violence Prosecution in Indictments by the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, from November 1995 to November 2002,” A Study of the
McGill Doctoral Affiliates Working Group on International Justice, Rwanda Section, November 28, 2002.
248

250

Askin, 106.

78

respect to genocide under article 2(b), namely, causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group.251
In addition to successfully prosecuting and convicting Akayesu of crimes of
sexual violence, the indictment broadened the definitions of rape. Acts of sexual
violence were defined as “forcible sexual penetration of the vagina, anus or oral cavity by
a penis and or of the vagina or anus by some other object, and sexual abuse, such as
forced nudity.”252 The Akayesu judgement further stipulated that sexual violence during
conflict does not require any prerequisites that the victim physically or verbally
communicate their non-consent to the perpetrator regarding the physical invasion of the
sexual nature.253 These broadened definitions set a precedent for defining and
prosecuting sexual violence in international criminal courts.
ICTR Indictments and Convictions of Rape/Sexual Violence
Following the amendment in the Akayesu case, several cases were amended to
include acts of sexual violence.254 Beginning in 1998, sexual violence was incorporated
into the initial indictments for all prosecutions instituted after 1998, which demonstrated
an increased sensitization on this issue, a more effective search for evidence and better
familiarity with the related legal tools.255 However, between October of 1998 and 2002,
no judgment involved a conviction for sexual violence. As of 2010, 25 percent of
completed sexual violence cases resulted in successful convictions at the ICTR,
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compared to the ICTY where 92 percent of completed rape cases resulted in successful
convictions.256
Following the Akayesu case, advocacy networks continued to mobilize around the
issue, which contributed to the overall sensitization of sexual violence at the ICTR,
feminization of ICTR staff, cooperative relationships with local women’s organizations,
establishment of victim and witness support units, and investigative reporting on the
systematic use of sexual violence. Activists continued to monitor cases, draft letters,
meet directly with staff at the ICTR, and provide expertise, all of which helped in
securing some sexual violence prosecutions.
As the success of advocacy campaigns can be contextually constrained, that was
certainly the case for the mobilization at the ICTR. As previously mentioned, chief
prosecutors, funding, and inadequate administration all impacted the prosecution and
conviction of sexual violence. According to Gaëlle Breton-Le Goff in her study on
trends in sexual violence prosecutions at the ICTR, numerous factors have affected
sexual violence prosecutions and convictions, including but not limited to; difficulties in
gathering evidence and taking witness statements regarding sexual violence, difficulty in
finding witnesses willing to testify, overall capacity to prosecute, scandals involving
investigators, inadequate witness protection, high turnover and constant re-staffing, and
poor cooperation between the Rwanda government and the ICTR.257
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Analysis of Advocacy Networks
The relatively poor rate of sexual violence prosecutions and convictions at the
ICTR is not reflective of advocacy networks’ ability to wield influence. On the contrary,
it demonstrates the complexities in international justice mechanisms. Notably, it is
beyond the scope of this thesis to further explore the various additional factors that
contributed to low levels of prosecutions and convictions. In this chapter however, I have
outlined the ways in which advocacy networks were influential and how their tactics
evolved in order to be more effective at the ICTR.
Despite the insistence of the prosecutor’s office that NGOs had nothing to do with
the prosecution of sexual violence charges in the Akayesu case, I argue that NGOs
certainly had a degree of influence on the prosecution. Although the prosecution did
pursue a deeper investigation into sexual violence at Taba following the revelation from a
witness, it raises the question as to how committed the prosecution and investigation team
was at the beginning of the case to thoroughly investigate sexual violence allegations.
Especially given that they had knowledge of the systemic nature of sexual violence from
Human Rights Watch’s investigations and detailed reports. Of course, the prosecution
could not simply ignore the testimony regarding sexual violence that was revealed in
court. This therefore suggests that a careful investigation into sexual violence at Taba
came as an afterthought. In addition, this also suggests that increased advocacy efforts
following the witness’ courtroom testimony placed by an extensive network of
transnational advocates encouraged the prosecution to pursue a thorough investigation of
sexual violence, to include sexual violence indictments in the Akeyesu case, and to
definitively define sexual violence for the ICTR. Moreover, following the amendment of
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the Akeyesu case to include sexual violence indictments, additional cases were amended,
which was proceeded by initial indictments including sexual violence.
The broad and precise mobilization of advocacy networks to generate political
will was built upon extensive tactics and advocacy tools such as informational politics,
symbolic politics and framing, direct legal intervention through amicus briefs, and
working with receptive actors within the tribunals. Albeit activists may have initially
been perceived by the prosecution as amateurish due to the amicus brief that was filed
during the Akayesu trial, advocacy networks sustained their advocacy efforts and became
increasingly professionalized in their pursuit of sexual violence prosecutions during their
advocacy at the ICTR. The most notably evolved and highly professionalized tactics
included sharing information from investigations, serving as expert witnesses, and
providing constructive criticism and professional support to the prosecution.
The information presented in this chapter supports my hypothesis that
international NGOs were the primary actors in advocacy networks to influence sexual
violence prosecution. The efforts of researchers and divisions within Human Rights
Watch were instrumental in initiating an advocacy campaign on the issue. Even though
local NGOs and groups were most certainly involved in the process of collaboration,
international NGOs played a pivotal role. International NGOs like Human Rights Watch
helped to bridge local NGOs to the ICTR, helped to mobilize a broad base of
international and local NGOs, and provided a professional role of expertise within the
court.
Although it has proved difficult to obtain in-depth information on the internal
dynamics of advocacy organizations and networks during this particular advocacy
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campaign, it is clear that there was great collaboration of NGOs, students, and lawyers
through the development of the Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict
Situations. Based on interviews with key activists in this campaign, it is clear that the
publishing of Human Rights Watch report “Shattered Lives” spurred an advocacy
campaign. After this report was published, researcher Binaifer Nowrojee continued using
various advocacy tactics while building off of her investigation and report, which was the
primary advocacy tool. This advocacy campaign was not a set job description for
Nowrojee and other activists and they clearly formed strategies and tactics to specifically
address issues and contexts intrinsic to the ICTR.
While the mixed success of sexual violence prosecutions at the ICTR can raise
doubt regarding the extent to which advocacy networks were able to influence the
prosecution of sexual violence, it demonstrates that advocacy campaigns can be
contextually constrained and that there was not a clear and simple evolution of tactics
from the ICTY. However, it is evident that some degree of development and refinement
in tactics was taken from the ICTY to the ICTR. This is particularly true in the case of
submitting amicus briefs on behalf of law school students, lawyers, NGOs, and
coalitions. Given the light that activists brought to the issue through various developed
advocacy tools, it is clear that without the advocacy efforts of advocacy networks, there
would have invariably been fewer prosecutions of sexual violence at the ICTR and less
recognition of the systematic nature of rape being used as a weapon of war in the
Rwandan genocide.
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Chapter Six: The International Criminal Court
This chapter illustrates the relations that transnational human rights advocacy
networks have with the ICC and the degree of pressure that they exert on the court. First,
the chapter traces the role that transnational human rights advocacy networks played in
the overall creation of the ICC, as well as their involvement regarding specific articles in
the statute on sexual violence. I then briefly describe cases that are being investigated and
prosecuted by the ICC, as well as the first conviction of the court. Next, I will highlight
how advocacy networks evolved and became highly specialized regarding advocacy
efforts for monitoring and influencing sexual violence prosecution. I then analyze how
advocacy networks have contributed to the prosecution of conflict-related sexual violence
at the ICC by looking at the strategies utilized and dynamics of the networks.
ICC Negotiations and Advocacy Networks
Advocacy in the field of international justice grew exponentially during the
negotiations for an international criminal court. Transnational human rights advocacy
networks built upon the foundation of advocacy for international justice that transpired at
the ICTY and the ICTR, including advocacy efforts specifically geared towards sexual
violence prosecution.
In 1995 the UN General Assembly created a Preparatory Committee for the
establishment of the ICC. From 1996 to 1998 there were six Preparatory Committee
sessions to prepare a consolidated draft text and NGOs were able to participate in the
drafting under the umbrella of the NGO Coalition for an ICC.258 Then from June 15 to
July 17, 1998, negotiations took place to finalize and adopt a convention for the ICC at a
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conference in Rome. NGOs participated at the Rome conference along with 160
countries, which ultimately resulted in the adoption of the Rome Statute that governs the
function and jurisdiction of the ICC.259 A Preparatory Commission, known as PrepCom,
was assigned with negotiating complementary documents, including the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, the Elements of Crimes, the Relationship Agreement between
the Court and the United Nations, the Financial Regulations, and the Agreement on the
Privileges and Immunities of the Court.260 Following the required 60 ratifications, the
Rome Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002, making the ICC the first permanent
international criminal court established to prosecute perpetrators of the genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes.261
The process for drafting the statute for the ICC was inclusive to civil society
organizations, as well as state delegation and international organizations. There was a
specific delegation that consisted of a large NGO coalition (the Coalition for the ICC) of
over 800 organizations, 236 of which sent one or more representatives to the Rome
Conference.262 Most of those 236 organizations were major international human rights
organizations or professional organizations of lawyers. Well established international
human rights organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, No
Peace without Justice, International Crisis Group, the International Bar Association, the
International Commission of Jurists, Lawyers’s Committee for Human Rights, and
Federation International des Ligues de Droits de l’Homme were all very active in the
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process because they were able to send one or more representatives to Rome and because
they had professional experience with the previous Ad Hoc Tribunals for Yugoslavia and
Rwanda. Notably, major international human rights organizations that had the capacity
to do so, such as Human Rights Watch, were beginning to form specific divisions within
their organizations to focus on the ICC and international justice.263
Due to the massive network of NGOs under the Coalition for the ICC, the
advocacy work was split into different groups. These groups consisted of regional
caucuses, who lobbied state representatives from their own regions, thematic caucuses on
gender justice, victims, children, peace, and faith, and 12 working groups on different
parts of the draft statute.264 Organizations and individuals within these three groups then
used the following strategies and advocacy tools; 1) lobbied state and intergovernmental
representatives, 2) prepared expert documents, reports, and scholarly journal articles, 3)
organized seminars and conferences, 4) disseminated information about the ICC to the
media and organization members, and 5) provided financial and expert assistance to
small and poor NGOs and government delegations.265
As previously mentioned, during the negotiations for the statute for the ICC, a
thematic caucus on gender formed, which was called the Women’s Caucus for Gender
Justice. This caucus not only advocated issues such as sexual violence, but they also
worked to include gender sensitivity throughout all functions of the court.
Activists within this caucus had been lobbying government delegations at the
Preparatory Committee meeting in February of 1997. These activists not only advocated
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for a gender perspective and articles addressing sexual violence throughout the statute for
the ICC, but they also worked to broaden a specific network of women’s human rights
organizations. At the time of the Rome Conference, the Women’s Caucus represented a
network of approximately two hundred women’s organizations all over the world.266 The
regionally diverse collection of organizations and individuals were united in their support
of main principles and goals of the Women’s Caucus.267 These goals were:
1) To ensure a worldwide participation of women's human rights
advocates in the negotiations of the ICC treaty to lobby for an effective
and independent court
2) To take advantage of this opportunity to educate governments
delegations and mainstream Human Rights NGOs on their commitments
to women and the need to integrate a gender perspective into the U.N.
3) To use this historical event as a means for popular education on
women's human rights and raise public awareness of the horrific nature of
crimes committed against women.268
Activists within the Women’s Caucus lobbied state representatives, as well as
actively participated in the negotiations for the Preparatory Committee and the Rome
Conference regarding gender and sexual violence provisions. Despite strong opposition
from anti-abortion groups, the Vatican, and some Islamic states regarding use of the
terms such as “gender,” the Women’s Caucus was able to successfully advocate for the
terms “gender” and “gender crimes” to be used in many of the provisions of the ICC
Statute, also known as the Rome Statute, instead of terms such as “sex” and “sexual
violence.”269 The position of advocacy groups was that the term “sex” was restricted to
biological differences between men and women, whereas gender includes differences
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between men and women because of their socially constructed roles.270 They
correspondingly advocated for “gender crimes” because it includes crimes, which are
targeted at men or women because of their gender roles, which may or may not have a
sexual element.271 This language in the Rome Statute broadened concepts of sexual
violence and gender-based violence compared to language used in ICTY and ICTR.
As will be discussed in more detail in the following section, articles in the Rome
Statute defining war crimes and crimes against humanity delineate a wide range of
gender-specific crimes and sexual violence crimes. This broad recognition of genderbased and sexual violence crimes can be directly linked to the advocacy and lobbying
efforts of the Women’s Caucus. In fact, the initial draft of the ICC statute in 1996 did not
specify crimes of sexual violence other than rape, nor did it recognize those crimes as
grave breaches of the laws and customs of war.272 The draft statute was later changed to
address rape and other forms of sexual violence as war crimes because the Women’s
Caucus heavily lobbied for the inclusion before and during the 1997 Preparatory
Commission.273 The Women’s Caucus also urged to separately identify sexual violence
crimes in order to recognize the distinct characteristics of the different crimes and to
acknowledge the aggravating harm caused to the victim.274
Activists and organizations within the Women’s Caucus learned from
shortcomings at the ICTY and ICTR trials, and during the negotiations for the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence pushed for progressive regulations that are sensitive to sexual
violence crimes. In due course, the Women’s Caucus’ negotiations were reflected in
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Rule 63, which stipulates that the Court may not require corroboration in a victim’s
testimony.275 In addition, in cases of sexual violence, the Court prohibits a defense of
consent and the submission of sexual conduct evidence unless such evidence is conducted
in closed proceedings and is highly relevant and credible.276
The continued lobbying efforts of the Women’s Caucus to weigh in on rules and
procedures of the ICC, as well as definitions and elements of crimes, after the adoption of
the Rome Statute further demonstrates the heightened level of professionalization and
organization of advocacy networks in influencing sexual violence prosecution in
international criminal courts. In the negotiations to enumerate definitions and elements
of crimes, the Women’s Caucus was able to successfully negotiate the inclusion of sexual
and gender-based violence definitions. Pam Spees, former Program Director for the
Women’s Caucus, noted the following in her article highlighting women’s advocacy in
the creation of the ICC; in the negotiations on the crime of rape, the efforts were to
ensure, that the elements maintained a focus on the crimes of the perpetrator, that the
force element was defined broadly enough to encompass the non- physical coercive
circumstances that often play on victims, that the definition would avoid unwieldy and
harassing specificity, and finally, that the definitions would be gender neutral.277
In addition to the aforementioned outcomes of the Women’s Caucus’ highly
organized advocacy campaign, the campaign also had a hand in shaping mandates
concerning the sensitive participation and protection of sexual or gender violence victims
and witnesses, as well as mandates to ensure a fair and equal presence of women on the
275

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, Rule 63 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
276
Rome Statute, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 70, 71, and 72.
277
Spees, 1240.

89

Court.278 Furthermore, the Statute for the ICC requires the Court to select staff with legal
expertise on sexual and gender-based violence.279 The Prosecutor is also required to have
advisors with expertise on sexual and gender-based violence, and the Victim and Witness
Unit within the Registry must have staff with expertise on sexual violence related
trauma.280
Sexual Violence in the ICC Statute
As previously mentioned in Chapter Three, rape and sexual violence were not
acknowledged as grave breaches of the Geneva Convention, nor were they considered
violations of the laws or customs of war. The seriousness of sexual violence crimes in
wartime and conflict were not recognized until the Ad Hoc Tribunals for Yugoslavia and
Rwanda specifically listed sexual violence crimes as crimes against humanity. While the
ICTY and the ICTR had historic cases that changed the jurisprudence of sexual violence
prosecutions for international criminal courts, the Rome Statute broadened definitions of
sexual violence and specified more sexual violence crimes than the ICTY and ICTR
Statutes. Although it has been previously mentioned in this chapter that the advocacy of
the Women’s Caucus led to increased recognition of sexual violence crimes in the Rome
Statute, it is important to note the detailed provisions in the Statute. These specificities
are noted below.
The Rome Statute not only progressively defines rape, but it further outlines a
spectrum of non-consensual sexual penetration. Rape is defined as:
The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in
penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the
perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the
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victim with any object or any other part of the body. The invasion was
committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused
by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression, or abuse
of power, against such person or another person, or by taking advantage of
a coercive environment, or the invasion was committed against a person
incapable of giving genuine consent.281
The Rome Statute is the first international treaty to explicitly list crimes of forced
pregnancy and sexual slavery. The Statute further recognizes the seriousness of sexual
violence by including such crimes under war crimes and crimes against humanity. War
crimes and crimes against humanity include subparagraphs that list a broad range of
sexual violence crimes. The crimes include: rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution,
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and any other forms of sexual violence also
constituting a grave breach/serious violation of the Geneva Conventions (regarding war
crimes) or other forms of sexual violence of comparable gravity (regarding crimes against
humanity).282
The Rome Statute was also the first treaty to specifically include gender to the crime of
persecution.283 Article 7(1)(h) prohibits persecution against an identifiable group or
collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, or other
grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in
connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction
of the Court.284
The Rome Statute includes sexual violence as an act of torture and genocide. If sexual
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violence is committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial, or religious group, it consequently qualifies as genocide.285 Rape and other forms
of sexual violence can constitute torture as a crime against humanity when the elements
of torture are satisfied.
The specific rules and principles of evidence regarding sexual violence in the
Rome Statute are also unprecedented and noteworthy.
•

The rules of evidence specify that the Chamber shall not impose a legal
requirement that corroboration is required to prove a crime, in particular, crimes
of sexual violence.286

•

The Chamber shall not admit evidence of the prior or subsequent sexual conduct
of a victim or witness.287

•

The Court shall note that in cases of sexual violence: 1) Consent cannot be
inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a victim where force, threat of
force, coercion or taking an advantage of a coercive environment undermined the
victims ability to give voluntary and genuine consent, 2) Consent cannot be
inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a victim where the victim is
incapable of giving genuine consent, and 3) Consent cannot be inferred by reason
of the silence of, or lack of resistance by, a victim to the alleged sexual
violence.288
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Cases at the ICC
The first inauguration of judges for the ICC took place on March 11, 2003,
followed by the selection of the Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, which
commenced the full functioning of the court in 2003.289 The Rome Statute stipulates that
the Chief Prosecutor can commence an investigation into a situation based on the referral
from a State Party to the Statute or from the United Nations Security Council. The
Prosecutor can also initiate an investigation based on information that he or she
receives.290 Currently the Prosecutor is conducting investigations into situations in
Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, Darfur
(Sudan), and Libya.291 The Prosecution has also been granted the authority to open
investigations into the situations of Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire.292
Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide background information
into all of the cases and situations before the ICC, it is worth mentioning briefly the status
of the current cases. For Uganda, one case is being heard before a pre-trial Chamber and
four of the suspects, who are members of the Lords Resistance Army, are still at large.293
There have been four cases for the Democratic Republic of Congo. The suspect in one
case remains at large while the pre-trial Chamber decided to decline to confirm charges
for the suspect in another case. The trial for the case of The Prosecutor v. Germain
Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui and the case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo both began in 2009.294 The only case before the ICC that has resulted in a
289
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conviction is the case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, which will be
discussed in more detail below.
There are five cases regarding the situation in Darfur, Sudan, before the ICC and
four suspects remain at large. After appearing voluntarily before the Chamber, the pretrial Chamber declined to confirm charges against Mr. Abu Garda, but confirmed charges
against Mr. Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus and Mr. Abdallah Banda Abaakaer Nourain,
and committed them to trial.295 For the Central African Republic, the case of The
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo is on trial. For the situation in Kenya,
following voluntary appearances before pre-trial Chambers, charges were confirmed
against William Samoei Ruto, Joshua Arap Sang, Francis Kirimi Mathaura, and Uhuru
Muigai Kenyatta, and they have been committed to trial.296 Due to the death of
Muammar Gaddafi, the case against him has been terminated. However, for the situation
in Libya, two suspects for a case remain at large.297 Finally, for Côte d’Ivoire, the case
The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo is set for a confirmation of charges hearing on August
13, 2012.298
Advocacy in the Lubanga Case
Although it is difficult to thoroughly analyze the influence of advocacy
networks on sexual violence prosecution at the ICC because only one case has resulted
in a conviction, a closer look into the Thomas Lubanga Dyilo case reveals the detailed
advocacy strategies of transnational human rights advocacy networks. Lubanga was the
President of the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) and Commander-in-Chief of the
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Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo (FPLC).299 On March 14, 2012,
Lubanga was tried and convicted of the “war crimes of enlisting and conscripting of
children under the age of 15 years and using them to participate actively in
hostilities.”300 Lubanga was not charged with rape or sexual violence despite extensive
testimony and evidence regarding sexual violence committed against child soldiers. In
the trial judgment, the majority of Trial Chamber I found that it was precluded from
considering this evidence, because factual allegations concerning sexual violence had
not been included in the Pre-Trial Chamber's confirmation of charges decision.301
It is important to note that international human rights NGOs such as Human
Rights Watch, Amnesty International and Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice, and
other activists and experts on sexual violence have investigated and documented the
high frequency of rape and sexual violence in the conflict in the DRC. These
organizations have shared their investigative findings and reports both publicly and
privately with the Office of the Prosecutor. From the preliminary stages of the
Prosecutor’s investigation into Lubanga and throughout the trial, Women’s Initiatives
for Gender Justice has advocated for the Office of the Prosecutor to both investigate
and include charges of gender-based crimes and sexual violence against Lubanga.302
Women's Initiatives for Gender Justice advocated that sexual violence was a
central component of each of the three crimes for which Lubanga was charged.
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However, their advocacy efforts were not successful. On 16 August 2006, the
Women's Initiatives submitted a letter and confidential report to the Office of the
Prosecutor, outlining concerns that gender-based crimes had not been adequately
investigated in the Lubanga case, and encouraging the Prosecutor to investigate
further.303 On 7 September 2006, the Women's Initiatives became the first NGO to file
before the Court, in respect of the absence of charges for gender-based crimes in the
Lubanga case.304 Legal Representatives of Victims also made an additional attempt to
broaden the charges faced by Lubanga by urging the Prosecution to specifically include
crimes of sexual slavery and inhuman and cruel treatment.305 Unfortunately, sexual
violence charges were not added and any evidence of sexual violence was considered
irrelevant because the Prosecutor’s Office did not include sexual violence allegations in
the charges.
The fact that the Lubanga case did not have charges of sexual violence is not
enough to simply dismiss the efficacy or influence of transnational human rights
advocacy networks on the prosecution of sexual violence in international criminal
courts. It should be noted that Prosecutors did refer to sexual violence in the opening
statements and closing arguments of the Lubanga trial. Sexual violence was further
recognized in a separate and dissenting opinion by Judge Odio Benito, who dissented
from the majority’s findings on sexual violence regarding enlistment, conscription, and
use of child soldiers. In this case, the Prosecutor could have included charges or
amended the indictment to include charges of rape, torture, sexual slavery, and or
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outrages upon personal dignity. The failure to include charges of sexual violence are
most likely due to investigations by the Prosecutor’s Office that were not conducted in
a thorough manner. In an interview regarding the Lubanga conviction, former legal
advisor for gender at the ICTY and ICTR, Patricia Viseur Sellers noted,
Given the evidence or information on sexual violence that came
out in court, it appears to me that there was the potential for even greater
probative evidence, had it been thoroughly investigated and included
initially in the charges or even amended into the charges.306
Analysis of Advocacy Networks at the ICC
Even though advocacy networks did not ultimately influence the prosecution and
conviction of sexual violence in the Lubanga case, there are still many ways in which
advocacy networks continue to advocate for sexual violence prosecution at the ICC. The
level of influence and participation of transnational human rights advocacy networks at
the ICC has not waned since the negotiations for the Rome Statute. In fact, the work of
advocacy networks focusing on the ICC has been become increasingly professional,
complex, and organized.
Although Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice is the major organization that
focuses exclusively on issues of gender and sexual violence at the ICC, it is important to
note that they have a broad based collaboration with the Coalition for the ICC, which
currently has 2,500 member civil society organizations, and other major international
NGOs who monitor the ICC. Since the Rome Conference, the thematic caucuses and
focus groups under the umbrella of the Coalition for the ICC have re-structured their
goals, like Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice. Following the advocacy efforts geared
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towards the Rome Statute, the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice changed its name to
the Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice and opened an office in the Hague to monitor
and advocate gender issues and sexual violence prosecution at the ICC.307 The other
various thematic caucuses and focus groups generally direct their advocacy efforts
towards ratification. They also lobby State Parties regarding international justice issues,
work to implement ICC provisions into national law, spread ICC awareness, and ensure
effective functioning of the Court.308
In addition to this continued organized advocacy work, NGOs have a unique
recognition and access to the Court that has not existed with previous international
criminal courts. Since the ICC was established, the ICC hosts one full week of meetings
twice a year where they have strategy discussions about their work with NGOs, who are
members of the Coalition for the ICC. The Office of the Prosecutor discusses
prosecutions, and arrests, while the Registry hosts discussions on issues such as outreach
and victim participation.309 The groups represented regularly at these NGO meetings
include major international NGOs like Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, No
Peace Without Justice, International Crisis Group, International Bar Association, and
Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice. Local and regional NGOs are able to participate
on a rotating basis based on funding made available by the Court or international
NGOs.310
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Although the Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice is able to focus exclusively
on gender issues and sexual violence at the ICC, other international human rights NGOs
that have broader objectives have devoted resources to continued focus on international
justice and the ICC. For example, both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International
have international justice divisions. Since the establishment of the International Justice
Division at Human Rights Watch, the organization has broadened their advocacy efforts
towards the ICC, compared to the single-minded focus of advocating sexual violence
prosecution at the ICTR.311 With that being noted, Human Rights Watch has still been
able to advocate for sexual violence prosecutions and charges at the ICC specifically
through their expertise in the situation of sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of
Congo. Expert researchers have shared information regarding sexual violence
investigations in the DRC through public reports, letters to the Prosecutor, and direct
meetings with the Prosecution.312
NGOs like Human Rights Watch and Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice not
only have developed professional staff, but they have also developed a high level of
expertise in specific fields, which makes them strategic dialogue partners.313 The
expertise that these organizations have been able to provide to the Court also makes them
relevant to the Court, particularly regarding cases where the Court does not have local
connections or background information and analysis. Human Rights Watch and
Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice have been able to provide trainings and expertise
on gender sensitivity and sexual violence. These organizations along with other
311
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international NGOs have been able to share information on sexual violence from
investigations, research, and analysis that they have conducted. Advocacy at the ICC for
general human rights issues and specifically sexual violence is a combination of personal
contacts within the Court and more formal advocacy tools. 314 Additional advocacy
strategies and tools are similar to the techniques used at the ICTY and ICTR such as
group meetings, private meetings with Court officials, letters, position papers, expert
documents, reports on specific issues, and press releases to the media.
The internal dynamics of these international NGOs have been able to mature and
develop with their collective and cumulative advocacy experiences. This experience has
enabled these organizations to expertly analyze proceedings at the ICC, as well as to
strategically decide which advocacy tools should be utilized and when. An important
internal dynamic to note is the make-up of the staff and advisors of these organizations.
For example, not only are the majority of staff members of these organizations
professionals with law degrees, but they also have diverse professional experiences that
lend rich perspectives and insights to advocacy work.
The professional development and lateral career moves of staff members has
given transnational human rights advocacy networks unique personal contacts with the
ICC. In the case of Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice, advisory council members
have been activists who worked extensively on advocacy for sexual violence prosecution
at the ICTY and ICTR. Rhonda Copelon, who directed the CUNY Law School clinic on
International Women’s Rights, was an advisory council member, as well as Ariane
Brunet, who co-founded the Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict
314
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Situations.315 In the case of Human Rights Watch, Sara Darehshori, who was a
prosecutor at the ICTR, worked in the International Justice Division at Human Rights
Watch. Although I have been unable to look into the professional backgrounds of all
advisors and staff members of NGOs, these examples illustrate a broader pattern of the
internal make-up of NGOs within transnational human rights advocacy networks. All of
these staff members and advisors bring with them not only expertise and professional
experiences, but a spectrum of professional and personal contacts.
Transnational human rights and women’s rights networks were able to build upon
the strategic objectives and expertise that they gained during their advocacy work at the
ICTY and ICTR. The Court is not only a potentially important concrete mechanism of
accountability; it also establishes basic norms of sexual violence prosecution that operate
as a model for political advocacy and domestic systems.316 Time will tell if the advocacy
for the inclusion of sexual violence and gender issues in the Rome Statute will influence
domestic and regional justice systems. Time will also tell if the advocacy efforts will
influence future convictions and charges in cases at the ICC. As the influence of
advocacy networks deepens on a variety of factors, including political will of prosecutors
and Court staff, the recent appointment of Fatou Bensouda as Chief Prosecutor may
influence improved sexual violence prosecutions at the ICC. Fatou Bensouda is the first
African woman to ever be appointed as Chief Prosecutor to an international tribunal.317
She spent more than ten years working as a prosecutor at the ICTR and the ICC, and she
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has publicly expressed intentions to prioritize grave crimes against women and children
and to develop a strong gender policy.318
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Conclusion
Given the information that was presented in this thesis on sexual violence
prosecution at the ICTY, ICTR, and the ICC, it is clear that transnational advocacy
networks have made contributions to the prosecution of sexual violence in international
courts and they have raised global awareness on the issue. Arguments can certainly be
made as to whether or not advocacy campaigns have been successful in prosecuting
conflict-related sexual violence. Although the progression of sexual violence prosecution
has not been particularly linear, the influence of transnational human rights advocacy
networks on the issue cannot be so easily dismissed.
As previously mentioned in this thesis, realist critics have cast doubt on the
influence of transnational advocacy networks. In fact, realist critics can look at the three
case studies here and point to the uneven norm change and reactive based strategies of
advocacy networks. I have argued that these criticisms of transnational advocacy
networks are entirely premature because the study of transnational advocacy networks
requires more development into the internal processes of these networks. A specific
internal dynamic that I highlighted and explored in this thesis is the professionalization of
NGOs and their focus on legal mechanisms and judicial frameworks.
Although transnational advocacy networks do experience some limitations in the
international system due to the dominance of states, transnational human rights advocacy
networks did wield a considerable amount of influence in the prosecution of sexual
violence in international courts and tribunals. This thesis has linked the
professionalization of international human rights NGOs and legal coalitions to the
increased recognition and prosecution of sexual violence in international criminal courts.
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I have demonstrated that well-established international human rights NGOs and legal
coalitions have been the primary actors in human rights advocacy networks to influence
the investigation and prosecution of conflict-related sexual violence in international
criminal courts. I have additionally argued that these international NGOs and legal
coalitions are primary actors and major players in human rights advocacy networks by
examining their evolution of tactics, strategies, and professionalization. International
NGOs play a prominent role in human rights advocacy networks by introducing new
ideas, providing information, and lobbying for policy changes.
Since the watershed prosecutions at the ICTY and the ICTR, advocacy networks of
human rights organizations have honed their skills in influencing judicial frameworks and
working within legal mechanisms. Legal communities maintain transnational contacts
based on professional interests, which suggests that human rights advocacy networks rely
on more than just the politics of information, symbols, leverage, and accountability.
Human rights advocacy networks have professionalized and legitimized themselves by
becoming legal and investigative experts, in addition to their roles as advocates. They
have in turn refined their investigative and report writing skills regarding conflict-related
sexual violence to a level acceptable to legal institutions. This professionalization and
legitimization has led to professional contacts and has given them access to legal
institutions of international criminal tribunals and courts.
Additional strategies and tactics of human rights advocacy organizations in
influencing sexual violence prosecution include publicizing the issue, detailing
investigations and research in reports, providing information to the courts based on
reports and investigations, submitting amicus briefs to the courts, provide expert
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witnesses in court, providing specific trainings to court personnel, linking victims and
local NGOs to the courts, and developing personal contacts within the legal institutions.
The personal contacts suggests that organizations have legitimized and professionalized
themselves through contacts with legal experts, thus sustaining contacts for professional
interests, not just by shared principles. The professional networking and contacts with
the legal communities also indicates some of the ways in which human rights advocacy
networks have strategically evolved. Participation of legal scholars and research skills of
staff members of international human rights NGOs informed the transnational human
rights networks internally and further legitimized the campaign from the perspective of
the courts.
The most notably evolved and highly professionalized tactics included sharing
information from investigations, serving as expert witnesses, and providing constructive
criticism and professional support to the prosecution units of courts. The ICTY, ICTR,
and ICC have been susceptible to being influenced by well-established international
human rights NGOs because they are considered to be independent experts. The
consultative recognition as experts has given these major human rights NGOs unique and
unprecedented access to international courts, particularly in the case of sexual violence
prosecution.
As previously noted, part of the professionalization of these well-established
international human rights NGOs is their financial capacity to form specific divisions
within their organizations to focus on the international justice and gender, to hire
thematic researchers, and to send those experts and representatives to locations around
the globe to conduct research and lobby courts. With the evolution of advocating for
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sexual violence prosecution, today there is even a specific organization that exclusively
focuses on advocating gender sensitivity and sexual violence at the ICC. These
international human rights NGOs have then been able to mature and develop with their
collective and cumulative advocacy experiences. A significant part of that professional
development is the make-up of the staff and advisors of these organizations. All of these
staff members and advisors bring with them not only expertise and professional
experiences, but a spectrum of professional and personal contacts, which lead to
improved and informed advocacy strategies and lobbying tactics.
Although this thesis highlighted the professionalization and evolved tactics of
well-established international human rights organizations in influencing sexual violence
prosecution, I was unable to delve further into more detailed findings regarding the
internal dynamics of these organizations. As it proved difficult to obtain in-depth
information on additional internal dynamics of advocacy organizations and networks, it is
clear that additional research should be conducted into the internal dynamics of
transnational advocacy networks. Also, in light of the relatively recent formation of the
ICC, it is recommended that further research be made into how international human
rights organizations and specifically the Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice are able
to influence sexual violence prosecution at the ICC.
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Appendix I-Names and Biographical Information of Interviewees
1. Sara Darehshori
Sara Darehshori is senior counsel for the US Program of Human Rights Watch
where she researches and advocates on issues related to police handling of sexual
assault cases.319 Darehshori was senior counsel for the International Justice
Program where she conducted advocacy on the ICC. Prior to working at Human
Rights Watch, Darehshori worked as a prosecutor in at the ICTR and she has
experience working as a corporate litigator for a law firm in New York.
Darehshori is based in New York City.
2. Elizabeth Evenson
Elizabeth Evenson is senior counsel at Human Rights Watch in the International
Justice Program, where she conducts research and advocacy related to the ICC.320
Evenson has a Juris Doctorate degree. Evenson is based in Brussels.
3. Juliane Kippenberg
Juliane Kippenberg is a senior researcher for the Children’s Rights Division of
Human Rights Watch and is based in Berlin.321 She has over 15 years of
experience conducting human rights research and investigations in Africa. She
has specific expertise on sexual violence in the armed conflict in the Democratic
Republic of Congo. Before working at Human Rights Watch, Kippenberg
worked as a campaigner for Amnesty International. She is based in Berlin,
Germany.
4. Géraldine Mattioli-Zeltner
Géraldine Mattioli-Zeltner is the advocacy director of the International Justice
Program at Human Rights Watch, where she conducts advocacy on the ICC.322
She focuses on justice issues in the Democratic Republic of Congo, universal
jurisdiction, and advocacy on international justice matters with the European
Union institutions and member states. Before joining Human Rights Watch, she
worked with the International Justice Project of Amnesty International. MattioliZeltner is based in Stuttgart, Germany.
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5. Gaëlle Breton-Le Goff
Gaëlle Breton-Le Goff is a member of the Coalition for Women’s Human Rights
in Conflict Situations and she is an international consultant.323 She is a Lecturer in
International Human Rights Law at the University of Québec in Montreal, in the
faculty of political sciences and law. She studies the role of NGOs in the
development of international norms and their contribution to international justice.
She is based in Montreal, Canada.
6. Ariane Brunet
Ms. Brunet was the Coordinator of the Women's Rights Program for Rights &
Democracy in Montreal between 1992 and 2008.324 Ms. Brunet contributed to
establishing the Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations. Ms.
Brunet is a co-founder of the Urgent Action Fund for Women’s Human Rights,
established in 1999. Ms. Brunet was a member of the International Advisory
Committee for the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s
Military Sexual Slavery, popular tribunal held in Tokyo, December 2000. She was
a board member of the Women's Caucus for Gender Justice and is now on the
Advisory Council of the Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice (WIGJ). She is
based in Montreal, Canada.
7. Binaifer Nowrojee
Binaifer Nowrojee is the executive director of the Open Society Initiative for
Eastern Africa (OSIEA).325 Prior to joining OSIEA, she worked for 11 years as
legal counsel with the Women's Rights and Africa Divisions of Human Rights
Watch. Ms. Nowrojee wrote the Human Rights Watch report, Shattered Lives,
about sexual violence in the genocide in Rwanda. She also served as an expert
witness at the ICTR regarding sexual violence. Before her work at Human Rights
Watch she served as a staff attorney with the Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights. She is also a lecturer at Harvard Law School. She is based in Kenya.
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Appendix II-Interview Transcriptions
On March 21, 2012, Jessica Welker interviewed Sara Darehshori over the phone.
In your position as a prosecutor for the Tribunal for Rwanda, did you have any
interactions or professional contacts with activists advocating for the prosecution of
sexual violence? If so, whom were the primary people advocating for that?
Yes. The people primarily advocating for that…well it was Human Rights Watch
actually, It was researchers at Human Rights Watch who I mostly remember having
contact with.
Was it several people at Human Rights Watch or just one person?
There were two that I remember because they came to Rwanda on mission. One was
Binaifer Nowrojee and one was Janet (I am not sure of her last name).
How did they advocate for the prosecution of sexual violence?
They told me that they found a lot of sexual violence in Taba, where the crimes primarily
took place for that first case and they informally shared information that they gathered in
their investigations. Essentially, they were trying to convince me that there was sexual
violence in Taba and that we needed to prosecute. We had overlap with witnesses. We
were on the ground interviewing a lot of the same people. In general terms, they shared
information that they gathered from witnesses and information that they received from
Taba.
Were they submitting any other information to the tribunal?
They wrote a letter to the prosecutor and then eventually they filed a brief in the court.
In your experience at ICTR, how was HRW perceived by the ICTR? Were they perceived
as professionals with expertise or just as amateurish NGOs who had testimonies?
There are two different responses to that question. On the one hand, we had Allison
Deforge, who was a senior person at Human Rights Watch, as our primary expert witness
and she was spectacular. So we recognized her as the leading expert in Rwanda, I don’t
think there was anyone who was really comparable to her and she was amazing and we
really…I know the court really relied heavily on her testimony, we really valued her
expertise, I mean she was a phenomenal expert witness.
However, the efforts to get the prosecution of sexual violence were, I would say,
considered on the amateurish side. One, when they advocated for sexual violence….first
of all….it is very hard when you are advocating for things at the prosecutors office
because from the outside, you don’t know what is going on the inside. The perception (of
NGOs) was that there was no interest in prosecuting sex crimes at the prosecutors office
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until we got outside pressure. That is totally inaccurate. We had Patricia Sellers at the
Tribunal already and she had already done trainings on sexual violence. So everyone
knew that this was going to be a landmark issue and it was a big thing within the office
that people wanted it to be prosecuted regardless with what was happening with the
NGOs. So that was one thing. The second thing, was the problem with all the evidence
that kept being presented to us was that there was no link to the defendant. So even
though the Human Rights Watch people rightfully shared information with us that
indicated that there had been a lot of sexual violence in Taba, we were charging the
Mayor of the commune with his involvement in the genocide. So there had to be a link
between the rapes and the mayor. You can’t just charge the mayor because rapes took
place in his commune. He wasn’t committing the rapes himself. No one was giving us
evidence that he raped people, nor was anyone giving us evidence that people under his
direct control were raping people. Remember he was a civilian authority, who had
almost nobody in his control. He had a couple of police officers that we could argue
were under his control and that was it. And no one was saying that the police officers
were committing the rapes and that he knew about it and didn’t stop it. There was no
link.
The evidence that we kept getting was that people were raped in the fields and it was
horrible. But there was no link to the defendant. So no matter how much evidence we
got from the NGOs, that there were people being raped in the fields, we couldn’t tie it to
the defendant, and you can’t charge the mayor for all the crimes that happened in his
village just because he was a mayor. And I remember that it was a frustrating exchange
because they couldn’t understand why if all these rapes were happening and he was the
leader of the town, he couldn’t be pinned with those crimes. But we couldn’t do it unless
there was a link. So that was one frustrating aspect about the advocacy around sexual
violence.
What ended up happening was that while we were preparing one witness for trial, she
said that she was present while there were rapes in the area of the commune office, which
was the mayor’s office, and that he was present. And more importantly, she knew people
who she would tell to talk to us about rapes that took place at the commune office when
the mayor was there. But it wasn’t until she told us that and she told her people to talk to
us…and even some of those people we talked to already but they didn’t tell us. So it
wasn’t until that point when we were able to make the link to the defendant. So it didn’t
have anything to do with the advocacy done by the NGOs and nor did it have anything to
do what is commonly known as this revealing moment in court when she suddenly
revealed that there were rapes in the commune under questioning. Because actually it
came out on direct testimony anyway, we already knew it because she told us in prep. So
we already started to pursue that investigation.
So the other big misconception is the amicus brief. There was an amicus brief filed by a
group of NGOs, but under the ICTR procedures you have to file a motion in which you
request to file an amicus brief. And if they are allowed to file an amicus brief, then you
can submit an amicus brief. They submitted an amicus brief without filing that motion,
so it wasn’t considered by the court. And from our perspective that amicus brief was a
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terrible disaster that put the entire trial at risk because the amicus brief contained a lot of
testimony from witnesses. So to put before the judges testimony from witnesses that the
defense did not have a chance to cross examine, was potentially extremely unfair and
could have caused a mistrial. So from our perspective we dodged a bullet by that brief
not being accepted by the court. The other thing about the testimonies was that it was
really easy to interview people and have them say, “I saw this, I know that.” But when
you question them you actually find out that it was hearsay, they weren’t there, or they
heard it from someone. You have to ask them “where were you exactly standing,” “what
could you see,” in order to ascertain whether they were an eyewitness or just a hearsay
witness. And so to have people putting in testimony before the judges without even
knowing for sure whether it was direct testimony and then not even having the defense
have the ability to cross examine the witness could have been very prejudicial…we
thought that it was a very bad move.
What did you do after being a prosecutor at the ICTR? Do you join Human Rights Watch
immediately?
No, I worked for a law firm and then I joined Human Rights Watch.
When you joined HRW, were you involved in advocacy for the ICC? If so, was any
advocacy related to sexual violence?
Yes. Well it wasn’t the same level. In the International Justice Program we have done a
lot of advocacy with respect to encouraging the prosecutor to broaden his charges or
investigate all the groups that have committed war crimes in the conflict and some of that
includes charges of sexual violence as representative charges against a particular group,
but it wasn’t the same single minded focus I think that Human Rights Watch used in the
Rwanda Tribunal.
How do you think Human Rights Watch changed or improved their strategies for
advocating at the ICC after some of the mishaps that happened with the ICTR?
Well the advocacy and the way Human Rights Watch has approached the court has
changed over time. There is a real caution for protecting our witnesses. Well, it is mixed
because one of Human Rights Watch’s missions or objectives is to get justice for the
most serious international crimes. So in that case it is not surprising that we would want
to encourage the prosecutor to prosecute and that we would offer background information
about where he should go and what type of charges to pursue based on the research that
we have done. But on the other hand we also have to be cautious about appearing too
linked to the prosecutor’s office. So I think that as international prosecutions have
broadened there is a certain arm’s length distance that we try to keep from the
prosecutor’s office. Both because we need to have continued access to conflict areas and
if people think that we are just secretly prosecutors then it will be harder for us to do that.
Also in our other role at Human Rights Watch, we critique the court in order to
encourage them to be as effective as possible. So it is a little easier to do that if you have
a professional arm’s length…relationship.
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Do you think that the staff at HRW has become more professional since the ICTR?
I think that with experience, people have learned quite a bit about how to advocate for
charges. I think that in the early days, before I came to Human Rights Watch, I think that
we put together some lengthy letter with a lot of detailed information...I think that we
tried to push prosecutors in a more detailed way. I think that it ended up being a big pain
in the neck for us because then they started requesting information from us about sources
and the defense starting requesting information about sources. So I think that Human
Rights Watch has developed just by virtue of practice over time, its own methodology for
dealing with the court that it definitely improved. In part, you don’t know until the court
actually functions how all this stuff is going to play out.
So I think that just by virtue by the fact that the court has been in operation for longer and
that we have a better sense for what is going to happen and how we can be useful and
what makes sense….naturally the relationship evolves in a way we figure out better what
we can do that makes the most sense, both for our purposes and for the court. But the
people I dealt with, even the people who I thought made pretty big mistakes in how they
advocated for sexual violence charges were still extremely sharp professional people and
experts in their area. But I think they just didn’t understand how it worked from the
prosecutor’s perspective. I think that one of the reason’s why I came to HRW is because
I really have a lot of respect for HRW and I thought that it would be beneficial for HRW
to have someone with an inside perspective so that we didn’t overstep.
What type of tactics does the International Justice Program at Human Rights Watch use
when they are advocating the ICC?
It is a combination of things. Sometimes it is letters to the prosecutor, I mean there is a
lot of communication and opportunities for interaction with the court. They have a lot of
meetings with NGOs and whatnot. So there is certainly some advocacy that takes place
in those direct channels with meetings with the court. We have also done a number of
private letters to the prosecutors and when we feel that that isn’t sufficient we have done
public letters. And we have done reports. And there is one report, “Unfinished
Business,” which is probably, I mean, it has caused a bit of tension with the court itself.
But if you look on the website it is probably a very good example of the way in which
Human Rights Watch…because it combines a lot of advocacy that we have done over the
years into one paper about things we think the prosecution should be looking into.
How has your inside perspective as a prosecutor helped with your advocacy at Human
Rights Watch?
It is helpful…both in thinking a little about how some of things I did in that role working
with people who were getting information to the court…mostly a combination of having
been in the court and of having been in practice was helpful in terms of trying to figure
out how to protect Human Rights Watch’s interests and also be useful. It informed any
advocacy that I was involved with in respect to the court and I think my colleagues. But I
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think that they are more sensitive to that now….I mean the group working was the
Women’s Rights Division. There wasn’t even an International Justice Program when
they were advocating to add the sexual violence charges…that was the Women’s Rights
Division. So the International Justice Program started a few years after that and I think
that the International Justice Program is more sensitive anyway to a lot of the issues that
they may have not been familiar with at the Women’s Rights Divison back in the mid
90s.
When they started the International Justice Program, who was involved? Was it just a
couple of staff members or was it a full division?
It started with Richard Dicker. He was the main force behind the International Justice
Program. The main stay has been Geraldine and Elise Keppler.
Was it a priority of the staff of this division to have law degrees and experience
practicing law?
I think that it has worked out that everyone has a law degree, except for Geraldine. She
has a Master’s in international human rights law, but she is not actually a lawyer. Most
of the time when we hire people, they are lawyers. It is useful when they have relevant
court experience, I think that that is definitely viewed as a plus. It would be unusual now
for the program to hire someone who isn’t a lawyer. But Geraldine is so masterful, she
knows a lot, but she is probably unusual in that regard.
Do you think that for staff members in this division having law degrees and advanced
degrees has helped to legitimize the way that they are perceived with the ICC and other
international courts?
It is hard to know how much that matters. What everyone relies on is the work. So if
your work is legitimate, you are considered legitimate. I think that it is easier to do the
work if you are a lawyer. There is a fair amount of legal stuff involved in addition to
policy analysis. I mean, it is much more technical than most divisions at Human Rights
Watch.
Was the International Justice Program the only division in Human Rights Watch that has
advocated for including prosecutions of sexual violence at the ICC or have other
divisions been involved?
I think that there has been some involvement of the Women’s Rights Division, but I think
that a lot of involvement comes from the researcher of the country. For example, the real
example where this is an issue is DRC.
Besides that, it is mostly the International Justice Program advocating the ICC?
Yes. The International Justice Program pretty much does all that effort.
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Regarding prosecuting conflict-related sexual violence in international criminal courts in
general, who do you think have been the major players in advocacy networks in helping
push for this prosecution and raising awareness about prosecution?
I don’t think it is domestic NGOs as much as it has been international NGOs. There is
one organization that has been particularly known for this. I am blanking on the name,
but it is based in Belgium. This organization, it is its primary focus. I think that they
have probably done reports, but they definitely do advocacy. But it is mostly
international organizations. Other ones have been REDRESS. There is a handful of
other groups that have done advocacy with the court.
I know that you have said that it is a misconception that NGOs were influencing the
prosecution of sexual violence because the Prosecutors Office was already looking into
it. Do you think that NGOs played any type of role in prosecuting sexual violence in
Rwanda?
I think that the role that they played was marginal. I mean, it was good to know from
their perspective how much sexual violence had taken place because we initially did not
gather that much evidence/testimony on that specific subject. The case was kind of done
in a not normal prosecutorial way, because the subject was arrested when the
investigation started. So it wasn’t like…the initial investigation found out mostly about
the massacres and not so much about sexual violence. So getting information about
sexual violence (from NGOs) was interesting. And we did send teams of women
investigators in to look into specific acts of sexual violence…but it wasn’t that
successful. I mean, they drew attention to the issue in a way that was probably helpful.
And the other thing was they sent letters to The Hague and did advocacy with the chief
prosecutor at The Hague. But I have no idea how effective that was. I mean it was really
distant; the contact was pretty intermittent with the head office. But at the end of the day,
they didn’t have the evidence that linked the defendant. So all their efforts…they
definitely drew attention to the issue. The question is…how much difference did that
make because that was already a priority for the office. They created an atmosphere
where there was certainly pressure to do this, but there was already a certain amount of
pressure to do that. The information they gave us ended up not being that helpful and the
brief ended up being potentially disastrous. It is one of those things where there is a lot
of mythology around this where NGOs think they were really helpful and NGOs changed
the course of the court by encouraging it to do this and that is actually just not true.
Has HRW submitted amicus briefs to the ICC or are they mostly publishing reports and
sending letters?
As far as I know, there have not been any amicus briefs submitted. Nor would we ever
try to sneak in evidence through an amicus brief, which is what happened last time. Well,
there may have been an amicus brief…on outreach or something but certainly nothing
comparable to that (the amicus brief submitted at the ICTR).
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Does the ICC ever request legal expertise or investigative information from HRW?
Not legal expertise. But they do sometimes communicate with us and ask us for
information. And if you look at the court records, you see that they reference our reports.
On March 22, 2012, Jessica Welker interviewed Géraldine Mattioli-Zeltner over the
phone.
So I know that prior to working at Human Rights Watch, you worked for the International
Justice Project at Amnesty International in London. I wanted to know what you did when
you worked there?
I did a couple of things. I was there in 1999 and I worked on issues related to universal
jurisdiction. This was the year when Pinochet was arrested. So I was helping them with
a couple of things. They did a comprehensive study on universal jurisdiction laws, which
have since been updated. But I helped them work on the first version. I had some kind
of fellowship with them. And then I helped them out on the Pinochet case by putting
together some jurisprudence and other things to present to the court. So I helped them
with that. And then the last thing that I did was to go to one of the prep conferences for
the ICC. And there was a big conference that was held in Paris to discuss the role of
victims and how to develop the rules around the role of victims at the ICC.
Did you do any type of advocacy regarding victims of sexual violence when you went to
that conference?
No. That is what I wanted to tell you. I don’t have specific expertise in terms of the push
for provisions regarding sexual violence in the Rome Statute because I came on board
after the conference. I was hired by Human Rights Watch in 2003. But I know that civil
society was key in pushing for those provisions to be included. One of the people I was
going to suggest you can talk to, if you can, is Whidney Brown. She was at the time,
during the preparatory commissions and the Rome Conference, in 1998 she was with
Human Rights Watch. And she helped develop the provisions in the ICC statute on
sexual violence and she is now at Amnesty International. She actually just wrote an Oped regarding the Lubango case. She would really have the historical perspective.
Who do you think are the major players advocating for international criminal
courts…whether it is specifically sexual violence charges or other issues? Would you say
that it is bigger NGOs or do domestic NGOs exert any pressure with these courts?
I think that it is important for you to know that the ICC is very different from other
Tribunals. Civil society has managed to establish a very unique relationship with the ICC
through mostly the Coalition for the International Criminal Court that developed almost a
consultancy status, even though we don’t have a consultancy status, but almost so in
terms of our interaction with the ICC. So since the ICC was established in 2003, we have
twice a year, one full week of meetings with the ICC, usually two days with the Office of
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the Prosecutor and two days with the Registry, where we have strategy discussions about
their work. With the Office of the Prosecutor, we discuss prosecutions, arrests,
cooperation…these kinds of things. And with the Registry, things that fall under their
mandate; outreach, victim participation, and defense issues. So as far as I am aware, this
is really unique. The groups represented at these meetings…of course some of the major
NGOs like Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Parliamentarians for Justice,
No Peace without Justice, International Crisis Group, International Bar Association,
Women’s Initiative for Gender Justice, etc. These bigger NGOs attend regularly. And
then usually there is also funding from the court or from some of the bigger NGOs to
enable local activists to participate as well, from regions where the ICC is investigating.
And they make sure that the local NGOs rotate so that it is not always the same activists
coming and so that there is an opportunity for different voices to be brought to the table.
So the local NGOs would rotate?
Yeah.
Would the bigger NGOs rotate?
No, the bigger NGOs are always there. There may be different people going to represent
the NGOs, but the bigger NGOs are always there. And the other way that we work…the
Coalition for the ICC has established teams on different topics. So those are all emails
teams. There is one on legal representation issues, one on protection, one on the use of
intermediaries, one on outreach, etc. So for each topic that is of interest to civil society,
there are teams, and for the teams there are both local and large NGOs involved. Through
these teams we try to establish a common position on the issues that we want to push for
the ICC. So through this means there is also a possibility for local NGOs to voice their
concerns. Another way that local NGOs can be involved in a discussion is through a
group that has been set up by REDRESS, which is also present at the meetings twice a
year, I forgot them. They set up something called the victim’s rights working group and
that is a very big group composed of both international and local NGOs that works
specifically on victim participation reparations and therefore would relate to issues of
sexual violence. Basically how to best represent the interests of victims and obviously
victims of sexual violence would fall in their mandate. There is therefore a lot of work
through email. There is a lot of work going in terms of civil society advocating at the
ICC; either through direct bilateral meetings, the meetings twice a year that are regulated,
email teams that produce papers, and the working group. So really there is a flurry of
activity that follows the work of the ICC. Whether we have impact depends on the issue
of course.
Given the legal framework that these civil society groups are working in, do you think
that there has been a professionalization of these advocacy organizations? If so, how has
the professionalization contributed to their influence at the ICC?
Of course. That is really not a question. If you look at all the NGOs I mentioned, and
even to be honest with you, the local NGOs…have professionalized. This is not an
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associated movement with voluntary people coming in and out. These are professional
NGOs with staff, who have developed a certain type of expertise, which makes them so
relevant in the field of international justice. It was like that in Rome and it continues to
be like that that some people in certain NGOs have more expertise sometimes than…ICC
staff. That makes us a good strategic dialogue partner because we have this kind of
expertise. So if I give you an example…we at Human Rights Watch know the region of
Eritrea and the Congo a lot better than the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC because we
have researchers who have been documenting the conflict and the crimes there since
1998. So that makes us a resource potentially for the Office of the Prosecutor to ask us
advice about some of the key massacres or advice about which translator to use…we of
course, have a good sense of what people on the ground are expecting from the ICC
because we talk a lot to civil society and the local population in those regions. And then
the same can be true in victim participation…some groups like REDRESS are used to
representing victims in legal proceedings. So they bring that experience and that
expertise to the ICC. So in answer to your question…absolutely all of these
organizations are professionalized, but beyond having a professional staff, they have staff
that are experts on the issues and then can therefore provide good advice to the court.
Can you provide a little bit of the history of the International Justice Program at Human
Rights Watch?
So basically it started very small in 1995 when the International Law Commission started
drafting the Statute for an International Criminal Court. That is when Human Rights
Watch started paying close attention to these developments and we entered the Coalition
for the ICC at the time in 1995. But at the time it was more the involvement in Human
Rights Watch of one key person, who continues to be the Director of the program,
Richard Dicker. But the International Justice Program was not created until 2000 at
Human Rights Watch and it initially focused exclusively on pushing the ratification of
the Statute for the ICC. It was a very small program with about three to four staff. And
then when I joined in 2003, the focus of the program at the time…you know of the course
the Statute had entered into force, but the Bush Administration launched a very nasty
attack against the ICC…so at the time we were really focused on backing the ICC against
this fierce attack by the Bush Administration of the United States. And then in 2003, the
first prosecutor and the judges were elected at the ICC and the program shifted its
attention to really trying to influence the policies of the ICC. We also focused on other
international courts…the Special Court of Sierra Leone, the ICTY…so we extended our
focus from the ICC to all aspects of international justice. Nowadays it is the same with a
heavy focus on the ICC (maybe 60% of the time is spent on the ICC), but we also work
on other issues of international justice. We have also shifted to dealing with how to
encourage more national prosecutions.
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Through your experience working with Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch,
do you think that these organizations’ strategies have evolved to be more focused and
efficient when they are advocating at the ICC and other international criminal courts?
Or are their strategies still the same?
I think that strategies have evolved. We continue to use a lot of the same means, like the
ones I already told you about-in terms of bilateral meetings and group meetings, letters,
position papers, expert documents, reports on specific issues-I think one way our
advocacy has evolved with the Office of the Prosecutor was at the beginning we raised
our concerns more privately with the Office of the Prosecutor in those meetings and with
little success, we have become more public with our criticisms of the court and the Office
of the Prosecutor in general. So I think that maybe that is the key change I can identify in
terms of our work. We continue to work on the same type of issues with the same means,
but maybe we are more willing to be public of our criticisms. In the past when the court
was so new, we felt that we should bring our concerns directly to the ICC and be less
public about it.
You said that one of your strategies is to raise your concerns privately. So how does an
organization like Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International gain access to the Office
of the Prosecutor for private meetings?
Well that has changed over time as well. At the beginning we used to have a really broad
access to the staff in the Office of the Prosecutor, but now it is a little bit more controlled
so they have designated staff to talk to civil society and NGOs. But we do have good
contacts in the Office, so there are many different staff members at the Office of the
Prosecutor that we can contact to have discussions and we also have direct access to the
Prosecutor himself. So we could call him, send him an email, request a meeting, see him
at different events.
How do you think these bigger NGOs were able to establish these key contacts and this
direct access to staff at the Office and the Prosecutor himself?
I think it is a combination of things. When Ocampo took office in 2003, one of the first
things that he did was to have a consultation hearing at which he invited the big NGOs,
small NGOs, academics, and others. So I do think that he did show that he was open for
discussion and then as I explained to you earlier, the Coalition for the ICC then set up
these bi-annual meetings, which has been a very good way for him to get to know us in a
way that creates an opening for a way to be in touch directly with him. We also do send
him letters…it is a combination of personal contacts and more formal advocacy tools.
I know that you have worked in this specific field for a while. What type of self-reflection
or self-criticism do you have regarding this type of advocacy? Does the organization
itself have any type of self-reflection about their advocacy efforts in how they have
advocated for the ICC?
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I don’t want to sound like we do it all perfect. I would have to think more about that.
Have there been strategies at Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch that have
not been as effective in your advocacy campaigns?
No. We use a lot of the same advocacy strategies…sometimes they work and sometimes
they don’t work. It depends on the advocacy target and their openness. I don’t really
think it is the tool or the strategy that is the problem…there are many factors. Something
that we don’t do…because we have decided that we don’t want to do it very much, but I
think that it is an important strategy more generally for civil society to use…is to be more
involved in judicial proceedings. And a lot of the advocacy that we do is typical human
rights advocacy. You know, meetings, letters, discussions, positions papers, etc. But of
course, the ICC is a court. So sometimes you can bring your issues directly to the judges
through amicus briefs and other things and this can be very effective. This is not
something that Human Rights Watch does, and as I said, we have decided not to do
it…so that’s our issue. But I think that it is effective and that it is a good strategy for
those to pursue who can and would like to do it. If you look for example at sexual
violence issues…like Women’s Issues for Gender Justice…they pushed for additional
charges (like sexual violence) to be placed on Lubanga. But we at Human Rights Watch
do a more traditional way of doing advocacy. We raised the issue publicly, we went to
meetings with the Office of the Prosecutor, etc., and that did not have a result because the
Prosecutor was not convinced. The Women’s Initiative for Gender Justice tried to file an
amicus brief…they tried to go directly to the judges to influence them. And I think that
in some way it had some impact because one of the judges was at least convinced. But
that is another way of doing advocacy. Some advocacy organizations are doing it, but
not all. But it is an interesting way of doing advocacy in a judicial environment.
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On March 28, 2012, Jessica Welker interviewed Elizabeth Evenson over the phone.
So could you just describe for me what you do at Human Rights Watch?
Sure. So I am a senior counsel for the International Justice Program at Human Rights
Watch and I work almost exclusively on the International Criminal Court, but also on
some initiatives where we are trying to get prosecutions of the same crimes that the ICC
prosecutes, the core international crimes-genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes, to be prosecuted at the national level. And I guess I would describe my job as
having a few different components. It is part policy research and policy analysis. So
doing research and analysis to make recommendations to the court about its different
policies and strategies. Also, to the members of the ICC that the court relies on for many
different things. And then it is also part advocacy. So taking those recommendations to
the court and to member states, trying to get them enacted. And also there is a certain
component to work with the press to try to explain what is going on with these different
international justice proceedings and try to get support for them and to put our
recommendations out there into the media in order to have an impact on court officials or
on states.
What type of strategies do you use when you are advocating at the ICC?
Well it really it depends on the issue. I guess we can really divide it into two categories;
policies that the ICC has that we are trying to influence or change and a second category
would be the actions of the member states. So the policies that the court has could be
anything from how they do their outreach and public efforts to what cases and
investigations that the prosecution undertakes. And there are different strategies. We do
some amount of meeting directly with court officials or court staff…trying to pass our
recommendations on directly privately, not necessarily confidentially, but not in a formal
paper or a press release. There is a level of communication that happens directly with
court officials. Sometimes we take it another step further and it might be helpful to have
something in writing, some type of public document to communicate recommendations to
court officials so that there might be interest by some states or the media, or other NGOs
working together on these issues, in order to move the court.
Now in all of that, I just want to be clear, there are important issues of independence…it
is a judicial institution. So the lobbying that we do with the court is a little different than
the lobbying that you might do with the Parliament or a Foreign Ministry. There are
careful lines…we are making recommendations and suggestions. When it comes to the
choices that the Prosecutors make, it is obviously an independent decision within the
Office of the Prosecutor. And when it comes to the judges…we really wouldn’t lobby
judges. If we wanted to make a point of legal interpretation, we would apply to do an
amicus brief before the court. So in that case we might provide material for
informational purposes to the judges, but we are not really doing advocacy to the judges.
If we wanted to do that, we would try to do that through the legal process itself. So the
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strategy itself really depends on what we are trying to achieve and what we think would
be the best routes for that to be. We work a huge amount in Coalitions, so we are part of
the Coalition for the ICC and we do a tremendous amount of work with NGO partners,
which consists mostly of joint position papers, joint meetings, and joint press
conferences. Not exclusively, but a lot of the work happens through Coalitions. Then
with issues that are in control of the States, it depends, it could be public documents
followed up by meetings, could just be meetings, or it could be trying to get press interest
to put pressure on States…it really depends what the goal is.
Who is a part of these Coalitions? Are they composed of mostly international NGOs or
are they composed of local NGOs?
Yeah, it is a real mix. So the Coalition for the ICC has 2500 members and you have a
real range from international NGOs to local NGOs. The most active members, in terms
of brainstorming, strategizing, and putting together joint positions, do tend to be the
large, international NGOs. Some of those, like FIDH are federations with local and
domestic partners, so in a way there is a direct connection for those groups working
within a country. When it comes to the advocacy that we do regarding the budget of the
court, in order to make sure that it has the resources that it needs to be effective…that
discussion and that strategizing tends to be more about the international NGOs, but we
try to get as many NGOs involved as possible and that communication is made by mostly
email and conference calls.
We aren’t doing this strategizing in person so that kind of opens up so that gives the
ability to have a more inclusive process. And the Coalition for the ICC has a secretariat
that runs the Coalition. We are a steering committee of the Coalition, but there is a
Secretariat managing these kinds of issues, communications between members,
informing members of different decisions, trying to get input on different issues. I see
that from more of a member side, rather than being responsible for administering the
Coalition. We also work with a more loose, ad hoc network of NGOs, that is not a
Coalition of any kind. Specifically in Africa…so African civil society organizations or
international organizations with an African presence like Human Rights Watch and they
work on international justice issues as they relate to the African continent and certain
specific concerns that have come out of that relationship between international justice,
African states, and African civil society. And with that, that is mostly NGOs from
different countries in the continent and a few international NGOs who have a presence
and who are working in Africa.
Who would you describe as being the major players directing their advocacy towards the
ICC?
The Coalition for the ICC for sure as the umbrella organization, Amnesty International,
FIDH, REDRESS, and No Peace Without Justice. Many countries have a national
coalition for the ICC, so you have the Ugandan Coalition for the ICC, the Congolese
Coalition. It depends on the issue, but those Coalitions can be pretty significant players.
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The Open Society Justice Initiative does a lot of work on the ICC. Those are the ones
who come to mind, but I am sure I am leaving some out though.
You were describing one advocacy strategy regarding policy at the ICC was to have
direct meetings and private meetings with the ICC. How has Human Rights Watch been
able to gain access to the ICC through those meetings? Do you think that it is because
HRW has a professional staff, the name recognition…or would any NGO be able to gain
access to those meetings?
Well it is actually a very interesting story with the ICC because (I have a feeling that it
might be unique) NGOs were just such a huge part of the push to create the court in the
first place. So leading up to the conference in 1998 where the Rome Statute was
adopted…NGOs were there, they were in the aisles, they were working with country
delegations. After the treaty was adopted, there was all kinds of preparatory work that
was done for the time when the treaty would enter into force and the court would come
into being. And NGOs were a part of those meetings. So in a way, it is almost…you
know, once a year all the countries that belong to the ICC (120 countries) get together for
an annual session and we go as observers. I think that it is kind of unique the kind of
access that is just expected that NGOs would have to these meetings…that they would be
there and that from time to time they would be given the floor. I mean there is still a
definite demarcation between governments and civil society and court staff. But it is
almost like having a seat at the table in a way that I think is somewhat unique, partly due
to the historic role of NGOs getting the court up and going. That seat at the table and
then just kind of continued, at least for now, to roll over.
Who knows from now, as the court gets more established, maybe states will start to
question how much…I think they have always thought that NGOs have a particular
expertise to offer because the court is working in X number of countries at a time and the
work it is doing at some level is supposed to be providing justice and responding to the
concerns of affected communities in these different countries. So NGOs have that
perspective to bring and the prospective of having seen other justice processes. I don’t
want to overstate it because it can still be hard to keep that state at the table and have a
voice that states respect.
I do think that there has been a level of acceptance that NGOs have something to offer to
this joint enterprise and institution. So that is just by way of background to say that I
think NGOs have a unique role or seat at the ICC. It is not specific to Human Rights
Watch, although since we were a part of that process to get this court created, we have
stayed at the table. I don’t know what the experiences of other NGOs who haven’t been a
part of the process the whole time…they have access to the court but again I think that
the Coalition for the ICC has taken on many new members. It is through that Coalition
umbrella that these kind of meetings take place. So twice a year there is a roundtable at
the court with staff of the court and members of NGOs, which is facilitated by the
Coalition for the ICC. There are different pathways that NGOs have had a seat at the
table and it is hard for me to say how unique of a position Human Rights Watch has.
Certainly the fact that we are part of a larger organization, that we have research in many
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of these countries, in addition to the advocacy that we are doing on international
justice…that certainly gives us an extra profile and an extra level of interest in our views
and our position. But overall the position of NGOs, I think, is unique to the ICC.
What type of expertise is required for Human Rights Watch if you are going to be
advocating at the ICC for the International Justice Program?
Well it is kind of hard to answer because if I look at my colleagues…well most of us are
lawyers, but not all and most of us have had prior experience with international justice
issues. I didn’t for example. I was a fellow at Human Rights Watch and was working on
Uganda and there was a big overlap with the ICC because of the ICC arrest warrants
there. So I had some relevant experience, but not experience directly related to the
international justice system. But I am a lawyer. I think that it is kind of difficult to give
an answer on that. I think that there are different kinds of expertise that goes into what
makes us effective researchers or effective advocates.
Do you know much about the history of the International Justice Program and how it was
formed?
Well I should know more than I do know, but my understanding is that there was work
being done on the push to establish the ICC. There was a lot going on. There was the
ICC being created and there was the Pinochet case in the UK and Spain. So there were a
lot of new developments going on in international justice and new opportunities to
enforce human rights law. There were new opportunities to document and to get
accountability for those human rights violations. I know that one of the priorities…there
was sort of a strategic planning process within the organization and one of the priorities
was decided to be international justice and the fight against impunity. It was out of that
that the program was created and I believe that was in 2002, but I don’t actually know.
And through your advocacy, have you been involved in any advocacy campaigns
regarding the prosecution of sexual violence at the ICC?
Not so specifically. So the kind of advocacy that I have done has been trying to make
sure that the charges are brought and the cases that are brought reflect the underlying
patterns of crime that has taken place. So in that sense…you know there are some crimes
that might be overlooked like sexual violence crimes or crimes against particularly
vulnerable or are particularly not visible populations…and our advocacy has been at the
somewhat general level. The strategy here should be selecting charges that reflect the
breadth of an underlying pattern and of course where that includes sexual violence, to
ensure that there are charges on sexual violence. So, it is advocacy more on a holistic
strategy as opposed to a strategy of just trying to increase the prosecution of sexual
violence. Which brings to mind one very important organization that I forgot to mention
before is Women’s Initiative for Gender Justice. They have been, along with Amnesty,
have a more specific focus on gender violence. (The Executive Director there is Bridid
Inder. And someone who has a similar position as mine there is Kate Orlosky. She
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actually used to be a consultant for Human Rights Watch. I know that there is a woman
at Amnesty International, Indira Rosenthall, works at Amnesty International on specific
themes of gender violence and international justice. She actually used to work for
Human Rights Watch as well). I have to say that I have been here at Human Rights
Watch for four years and we may have done more specific work on gender violence, but I
am not so aware of it. Again, we have certainly called for its prosecution when it has
been part of that underlying pattern of crime. The Office of the Prosecutor has a gender
and children’s unit, with expertise on gender. We have certainly joined the call for
making sure that there is that gender expertise in the office and other parts of the court
but I think we haven’t had that much focus on looking why or why not sexual violence is
being prosecuted or why it has not been as successfully prosecuted at the ICC.
What did you do in Uganda when you were a fellow for Human Rights Watch?
Well I was doing several different projects but my main project was documenting abuses
by the army operations in the Northeast of the country. Not the area affected by the
Lord’s Resistance Army, it is another part of the country that has a really high rate of gun
violence. The government was engaged in an operation to disarm and kind of get rid of
guns in the region and they were committing a number of human rights violations in the
enforcement of these operations.
I just wanted to jump back to when you were explaining that Human Rights Watch has
direct meetings with the ICC. What information is presented at the meetings? Is it
information that Human Rights Watch has gathered through their research and
investigations or is it just general recommendations that the International Justice
Program has for the ICC?
Well I would actually rather not get into the specifics of that. Some of the meetings are
more open then others but I think that it probably would not be appropriate for me to go
into the details of the private meetings. What I can say is that when we do a report on a
country that the ICC is investigating, we certainly make sure that the court has that
information and we certainly make sure that that information is passed along. You can
see in a lot of our public materials that we would call for the Prosecutor to investigate a
specific pattern or to make sure that investigations are impartial. We certainly make sure
that the court is aware of our research.
Does the court ever request specific research or investigative findings from Human
Rights Watch?
Yes it does.
What type of information do they request?
Again, I don’t think that I can get into that.
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I think that there are going to be limits to your research. I mean much like how I don’t
want to get into the specifics of what we might discuss in these meetings, there might be
limits to what people might want to tell you because there is some confidentiality
attached. Also, we also don’t just relate to the Office of the Prosecutor. There is also
defense and victims representatives at the ICC. We are a human rights organizations so
we have an interest in fair and credible trials. So it is not just a relationship, by no means
at all, with the Office of the Prosecutor. I think that the Coalition for the ICC would be
helpful for you. I know that people are busy and they may not make it a priority to get
back to you, but I would definitely keep trying to get interviews.
It might be useful for you to understand that there are different kinds of interactions
NGOs have with the ICC. On the one hand, there are policy discussions. These could be
on a range of issues – victim participation, witness protection, outreach, prosecutorial
strategies. But they are not part of the investigations per se. Then, on the other hand, the
Office of the Prosecutor in the course of its investigations may contact NGOs to facilitate
investigations or to call NGO experts as witnesses. I think both kinds of interactions are
relevant to your thesis – on the one hand, NGOs play a role in pushing as a general matter
for the mainstreaming of the prosecution of gender and sexual violence crimes. On the
other hand, some NGO experts may be witnesses in investigations.
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On April 2, 2012, Jessica Welker interviewed Gaëlle Breton-Le Goff over Skype video
call.
So I saw on your bio that you are a member of the Coalition for Women’s Human Rights
in Conflict. I was wondering how long you have been a member of that coalition and
what you have done as a member of the coalition.
I have been a member of the coalition since 1999.
What have you done specifically as a member for the coalition?
Well I did a lot on monitoring the ICTR. Also investigating the prosecution and the
choices made by the prosecution to prosecute sexual violence. I also worked for Sierra
Leone. I had two field missions in Sierra Leone to work with the truth and reconciliation
commission and to monitor the work of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. I also
participated in the writing of the report on the courts, specifically the chapter on sexual
violence. I was part of a group of people who were working on that.
Who else was working on that with you?
Binaifer Noworjee, Rhonda Copelon, Isabelle, etc.
And when you were monitoring the ICTR regarding sexual violence, were you doing any
specific advocacy along with the monitoring?
Well we had people in the courtroom who were monitoring and observing, but at the
same time this person had contacts with investigators or prosecutors. So we had different
ways to get information. We had the official way, going to the courtroom, and also
having small talks in the corridors.
In your experience monitoring the courts and working with the Coalition, were you
influential in the prosecution of sexual violence?
Yeah, we produced the amicus brief in a case…we wrote it and we sent it to the court.
Even if the court didn’t accept the amicus…the court denied the request…first they
decided to stop the trial and second they decided to invite the prosecutor to take more
time for a deeper investigation into sexual violence. And the result…well the
amendment…in the indictment they added sexual violence as charges of crimes against
humanity.
Who exactly submitted this amicus brief?
Well it was a coalition of non-governmental organizations. We have in our coalition
people who had experience working in Rwanda and people who knew real well the civil
society in Rwanda. So because of these different contacts and specially with having
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contacts with women’s organizations we were successful in organizing this coalition and
writing an amicus and sending the amicus to the court.
So was the coalition composed of international NGOs or was it predominantly local
NGOs?
Well you have to understand that the coalition is a virtual network of people. The
coalition members are people, not really non-governmental organizations. We have
people who run NGOs, like Carla who runs REDRESS in the UK. We also have
Congolese partners who run NGOs. But most of the people who are there are there as
individuals, not as representatives of an NGO. It is because they have special expertise
of sexual violence in conflict. So we are a group of people coming from Africa and
North America and the UK.
So this amicus brief that you were talking about earlier…what specifically was in the
amicus? Was it information regarding the investigations that members had conducted?
What exactly was in the amicus?
Well you probably know at that time that in 1996, Human Rights Watch published a
report about sexual violence in Rwanda. They documented the fact that rapes were
systematic at this time. Anyway, first we wrote to Goldstone, who was the prosecutor of
both tribunals at the time. He understood that it was necessary to prosecute sexual
violence and apparently he had information for Yugoslavia, but not really for Rwanda.
And you probably know that Goldstone didn’t stay for long there. So when the next
prosecutor came we contacted her to ask her what is going on with sexual violence (in
Rwanda) because it was enormous and nobody was willing to prosecute it at the ICTR.
At the beginning she wasn’t convinced about this. And you also have to understand that
this context was very hard for a prosecutor to work on ICTY and ICTR. She was the
prosecutor for both trials and her task was very large and heavy.
After trying to encourage to prosecute sexual violence unsuccessfully we decided to
submit an amicus. There was an article in the ICTR that allowed people to file an amicus
brief. An amicus brief is an expert argument. So what we did in this amicus…we didn’t
do it without having any evidence. What happened in the Akeyou case is that four
witnesses talked about sexual violence when they were testifying. They were not
supposed to do it but they did. So once we noticed that we had an opportunity to file an
amicus we used this information because it was in the court and in transcripts. So we
used it and we used the information from the Human Rights Watch report and we said
that there are witnesses and testimony about sexual violence, you just have to find it and
document it. We also had different legal arguments. Usually amicus briefs are not
supposed to be factual, they are supposed to be legal. So we developed legal arguments
and specifically talked about rape and crimes against humanity. We also talked about
rape as a tool of genocide.
We also sent another amicus brief in another case with three people being prosecuted in a
joint indictment. We knew at that time that the prosecutor had testimonies and evidence
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of sexual violence in those cases. We also knew that…it was a different prosecutor at
this time and we knew her. We knew that it was the choice of Carla del Ponte not to
prosecute sexual violence even though they had evidence of sexual violence. So we also
sent an amicus brief, but this time it didn’t work and the amicus was denied and we were
not successful.
Do you know why the amicus was denied?
Well, yes. First the court said that the amicus came too late in the trial. Second, it was
because we asked the court to stop the trial and invite the prosecutor to amend the
indictment to add sexual violence charges. They said that we were overruled by the
power of the court, so they didn’t accept this. And you have to understand that an amicus
brief, accepted or not, is something that is discretionary. The court is not obliged to
accept it.
Have you been involved in any advocacy efforts to prosecute sexual violence at the ICC?
Yes.
And what specifically have you done?
Well all the DRC cases and also the Bamba case.
What type of strategies or tools have you used to advocate for sexual violence
prosecution?
There is an organization in The Hague called the Women’s Initiative for Gender Justice.
They are doing a lot of advocacy regarding sexual violence at the ICC. So we choose not
to redo this work. We are located in Montreal and we are not at The Hague and we don’t
have enough resources to go to the Hague often and be involved in discussions. So we
decided not to do the kind of advocacy that we were used to doing at the ICTR and to let
the Women’s Initiative do it. Of course we did some press conferences and went to the
Parliament in Canada to sensitize our parliamentarians to do something for the women in
DRC because the situation is absolutely awful. This was more of a development
approach and we did this to convince our parliamentarians to adopt some policies in favor
of the fight against impunity regarding sexual violence in the DRC. We began to work
on the reparation issue, because all these women need to be compensated and need
reparation for what happened….we organized a seminar conference on reparation.
When you say “we” who do you mean?
Well, the Coalition.
What role do you think that NGOs played in contributing to the prosecution of sexual
violence at the ICC?
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There are two things. First, local NGOs were called by the ICC prosecutors to be
intermediaries between witnesses and the ICC. Why? Because for security reasons, most
of the time, the ICC prosecutors could not go into the field to find witnesses. So they
contact NGOs known to work with victims and they have the NGOs bring the victims to
them. If you read the Lubango judgement, you will find the role of intermediaries from
local NGOs. And you will also find what kind of problems are coming from this.
Second, when the first prosecution began in DRC…there was a state of war and it was
dangerous. At the same time the Security Council sent the Darfur file to the ICC because
at the time the ICC did not have so many investigators. So Ocampo (the ICC prosecutor)
decided to take those investigators out from Congo and send them to Sudan. So what
happened…they stopped the investigation to go to Sudan. When the investigation
returned to the Congo, the investigators were different because there is a lot of turnover at
the ICC. So that is why it was difficult. Ocampo wanted to go very fast with the case
because he wanted to show to the world that the ICC was working. So he decided to go
with this case on Lubango. There were only two kind of charges…recruitment of child
soldiers and nothing about sexual violence. So what happened at this time, the Coalition
for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict and the Women’s Initiative for Gender
Justice…we thought about filing an amicus brief. Finally we sent an amicus brief and as
you probably know, this did not succeed. So the Lubanga case went to the court and did
not have charges of sexual violence. And after that we had press releases and we went to
the ICC…we decided to be part of the Coalition for the ICC committee on sexual
violence. On the Katanga case you have some sexual violence charges, but you could
have more. Of course, we continue to monitor the work of the ICC and the way they are
charging sexual violence.
What role do you think that bigger international NGOs have in prosecuting sexual
violence in international criminal courts?
What I know…they don’t have a lot of influence. The Prosecutor decides his own
strategy and he has to report to nobody. He is the only one who decides the prosecutorial
strategy. Ocampo was not really interested in prosecuting sexual violence because it
would have been possible for him to have the court amend the indictment in the Lubanga
case. After the Lubanga fiasco on sexual violence, big international NGOs like Human
Rights Watch and Amnesty International and FIDH…we were so upset by this lack of
understanding about sexual violence. We made a lot of noise. And if you go onto the
Human Rights Watch website or the Amnesty website or the FIDH website, there is a
mountain of documents documenting sexual violence in DRC. For after that it is not
really possible to ignore sexual violence. I think that because the NGOs were so
vocal…you had the first amicus brief…he knows that he is being watched by NGOs on
this issue of sexual violence. It is interesting to see how this issue of sexual violence is
attracting attention. Every international NGO is interested in this matter.
Do you think that given this legal environment that NGOs are working in, these NGOs
have professionalized to be perceived as more legitimate and improve their advocacy
strategies?

129

You have NGOs like Human Rights Watch for a long, long time working on sexual
violence. They have knowledge and they have money. They can send people to the field
and they can maintain people in the field for one to two years. They publish and do
reports.
Do you think that since the ICTR these organizations have become more professional?
I have no idea, I cannot answer.
What about your experience with the members of the Coalition that you are a part of?
We are all lawyers.
And how do you think that that has helped with your advocacy efforts in prosecuting
sexual violence?
Well it helps toward the legal argument. It helps to identify what kind of strategy to use.
It helps to understand and identify through the course of the trial what is problematic and
that is why we can sometimes have small legal discussions with prosecutors and judges in
the corridors regarding specific parts of law. It could be a technicality but it could be a
technicality that is important for the court. Yes, it helps us. Also we monitor the work of
the ICC, we are able to see how crimes are interpreted and the evolution of this
interpretation and the danger of this kind of interpretation or not. Most of the time the
discussion that we can have is informal. We are going in public when we usually didn’t
succeed to do it informally.
Have there been any tactics that have evolved within this broader network of advocacy
for sexual violence prosecution?
Before it was only us doing this advocacy. Since that time it has changed a lot, especially
with the ICC. So strategies didn’t really change since that time but there are more
players now. There are more organizations working on this issue.
Who do you see as being the major players for influencing the prosecution of sexual
violence?
Well I wouldn’t say influence because the Prosecutor is hardly influential. But in the
ICC on Bemba, FIDH played apparently a very important role in documenting sexual
violence and identifying witnesses and they sent this information to the Prosecutor. I
would not generalize…I can only tell you about what happened with FIDH in the Bemba
case. In the DRC there have been many reports and documentation has been sent to the
Prosecutor in the Lubanga case and they didn’t succeed. So the effects of two same kind
of actions are different. I don’t know what happened. I have an idea. I think that in the
Lubanga case the Prosecutor was in such a huge hurry to push the first case for the ICC.
And Bemba was after and they had more time and more people who were better trained
like investigators.
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On April 19, 2012, Jessica Welker interviewed Juliane Kippenberg in-person in Berlin.
Due to technical difficulties, this interview was not recorded and therefore could not be
transcribed.
On May 8, 2012, Jessica Welker interviewed Binaifer Nowrojee over the phone.
Where you the only researcher doing research for Human Rights Watch on sexual
violence in Rwanda or were there other researchers?
There were two of us. Me and a woman named Janet Fleishman. And we basically put
together the report, Shattered Lives, which came out in 1998.
I understand that you were an expert witness for ICTR. Did you serve as an expert
witness because of your work in Shattered Lives?
Yes, I served as an expert witness for the prosecution at the Rwanda Tribunal based on
the research that I had done interview rape victims about rape as a weapon of war during
the Rwandan genocide.
Did the tribunal reach out to you to be a witness or was it part of your advocacy for the
report to reach out to them and offer yourself as an expert witness?
Well if I can just tell you the story of how it all came to be. Essentially, the Rwandan
genocide took place in 1994. At that time at Human Rights Watch, I worked for the
Women’s Rights Division, looking at gender based violence issues. And there had been a
lot of discussion of rape as a weapon of war in the former Yugoslavia and discussions
about justice for women. And it had been assumed that the gains that had been made in
terms of prosecution for perpetrators of sexual violence at the Yugoslav Tribunal would
essentially continue into the work of the Rwanda Tribunal. So 1995, 1996 we continued
to watch the work for the Tribunal for Rwanda and began to realize that in fact, there
wasn’t much done in terms of looking into crimes against women. So in 1996, two years
after the genocide, I traveled with a colleague to Rwanda and we spent some time
tracking down women victims who had been raped to get their testimonies. That
eventually became the basis for the report, Shattered Lives. Now when that first came
out, when we were finalizing the report, the first indictment came out of the Rwanda
Tribunal against the mayor of a place called Taba. A man named John Paul Akeyesu.
And he was charged with 19 counts and none of them included sexual violence. We had
been to Taba several times because there had been so many victims of rape there. So we
contacted the Tribunal to say how could these be there was extensive sexual violence that
took place in this area, how could you not count him responsible for sexual violence? At
the Rwanda Tribunal you are charging people for not necessarily doing the crime
themselves but also for being in the position of responsibility to prevent or punish it.
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What is called command responsibility. So essentially we went back to the Tribunal and
said how can this be and we shared testimony without providing the names, but
testimonies. And they eventually sent another team to go back and re-do the interviews
and look for sexual violence victims. We continued to try to push the Rwanda Tribunal
to do something and another year went by and nothing happened. And eventually I went
to a group of women lawyers to file an amicus brief at the court, which basically two to
three weeks after that was filed and there was an appearance of two rape victims, who
spoke about rape on the stand. The court recommended that the prosecution go back and
look into the issue of sexual violence and they amended the charges almost to the point
where the prosecution was going to close the case. And then when the judgment came
out it was a groundbreaking judgment that was essentially historic in that it charged
sexual violence as a crime of genocide for the first time ever and it also charged sexual
violence under the Geneva Conventions in an internal conflict. So the judgment became
a groundbreaking judgment in terms of ensuring justice for sexual violence victims at the
international level. But it was a long struggle to get it and had the tribunal at the get go
had been able to just follow some its own course, it is very unlikely that without the
advocacy and pressure for them to look at justice for women, they wouldn’t have done it
on their own. Subsequent to that, they began to look much more at this issue and you
have different prosecutors that come forward. So the first prosecutor was Richard
Goldstone, who basically set up a lot about charging sexual violence as a group but
actually nothing happened. You have the second prosecutor Louise Arbour, who actually
does significant work. She creates the sexual violence team that begins collecting
testimonies. She begins to think of ways that this can be incorporated and added as
amendments to the charges. So during her tenure you begin to see a number of cases
starting to get amendments adding sexual violence charges in to the point where by the
time she leaves, up to 100% of cases coming in under her watch include sexual violence
charges. She has been replaced by Carla del Ponte, who has no commitment to this issue.
And over Carla del Ponte’s time she begins to ignore these issues. So that by the time
that Carla leaves, there are zero percentage of sexual violence charges being brought in
the new cases filed under Carla. So you begin to see how the political will of the
prosecutor in looking at these issues is extremely important. So you are still at the stage
where sexual violence charges aren’t being incorporated as crimes of war. It is very
much dependent on the political will of leaders in place. The next thing that you find is
that the skill set of investigators looking at this crime is often wanting. So when you start
looking at the witness statements that are collected by investigators…you find hit and
miss. Sexual violence is added on as an afterthought. It is not properly integrated at the
beginning of the ICTR’s work, amendments are brought later, it is not put into the case
mapping at the get go. And so what you find is that when prosectors are ready to walk to
the courtroom they have a situation where the cases that they are bringing are weak
because it has not been properly investigated in terms of training of the investigators on
how to collect evidence, the elements of the crimes and what they need to gather and
incorporating it in part of a bigger picture. So if you think about the scale of sexual
violence and the fact that in Rwanda hundreds of thousands of women were raped and
often in public places, virtually every indictment should include culpability and
responsibility for sexual violence crimes but in fact that is not the case at all because it
has been added on as afterthought.
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So what type of pressure did you place on the court? Besides the amicus brief, were
there any other type of advocacy tools that you used when you were pushing for this type
of prosecution at the ICTR?
Well essentially the report published by Human Rights Watch was one of the first reports
that had collected and documented these crimes in a way that showed the widespread
nature of them. So the report itself became an advocacy tool because it was out in the
public domain so that at first tribunal officials were saying “well it is different,” “well
African women won’t speak about it.” But it was clear when Shattered Lives came out
that in fact the interviews were conducted in a conducive manner where women had
enough privacy and trusted to speak that they would talk about these things. The other
thing that I did was to work to help the prosecution team to look through their cases and
assist them. So it wasn’t just a matter of criticizing and pointing out the short falls, but
also trying to constructively assist the prosecutor’s office in terms of looking at the
evidence, looking at their witness statements, and serving as an expert witness in some of
the trials.
After you published the report, did you have any other type of follow up advocacy?
Absolutely. That report, well any Human Rights Watch report that is done is just the
starting point for a whole campaign to bring this issue to the attention of policy makers,
of women’s rights groups. So there were a large number of meetings that were held with
government officials, with humanitarian groups, with the Rwandan government, etc.
You will find in the report that there are also recommendations for different actors,
including the Tribunal. So the report becomes a starting point for meetings and
discussions about how those recommendations could be implemented.
I saw in the report for Shattered Lives that it was a collaboration with FIDH. At the time
were you collaborating with any other international NGOs in your advocacy campaign?
Yes. I was part of a group called Women’s Coalition Against Violence Against Women
in Armed Conflict. So I worked with a broad based group of other feminists and legal
scholars who were interested in ensuring justice for women. So it was very much a
collaborative effort. It was never a solitary pursuit. And of course there were people
within the Tribunal who were individually interested in ensuring that this issue was
covered and we also worked with them. There were those in the Rwandan government,
there were women’s groups themselves working to make sure that justice was an issue
that was covered and doing awareness raising.
Besides Human Rights Watch, which organizations were the major players in pushing for
prosecuting sexual violence at the ICTR?
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Well the Coalition that I was talking about, which was a number of different groups and
individuals. Rights and Democracy in Canada the organization that housed the Coalition
so it was critical. The Open Society’s Justice Initiative came later on. There was some
attention at the get go but eventually there was not that much attention to the situation in
Rwanda.
When you were interacting with the prosecution at the Tribunal for Rwanda do you feel
that they interacted with you as a professional or did they view NGOs as mostly
amateurish?
I think that it is very much mixed. I don’t think that there was an institutional policy at
all. I think that it was very much independent on the individual prosecutor. But after a
number of years of being criticized for not taking this issue too seriously I think that there
was a number of trainings and awareness raising and ultimately a lot of respect. My
colleague Alison des Forges also served as an expert witness in virtually every single
trial. Her background was Rwanda.
Have you done any advocacy at the ICC?
I have done trainings. I trained the Sudan and Central African Republic teams on
collecting evidence and human rights victims. But I am not involved in those trials in the
same way that I was at the ICTR.
How many years were you involved in an advocacy campaign geared towards the ICTR?
About ten years. And then I got a fellowship and I took a year off work and spent a year
in Rwanda talking to the women who testified at the tribunal in order to get their views of
international justice from the perspective of a rape victim. We all celebrate the judgment
if we are lawyers but nobody goes back to check how the women and witnesses perceive
this justice. I took a fellowship and I ended up writing an article called “Your Justice is
Too Slow.”
While working on this campaign for ten years did your tactics and strategies for
advocacy change?
Absolutely. Over the years I got to know a lot of people at the tribunal and work
collaboratively with them, I was a witness. I wasn’t just advocating, I was also providing
as much as I could in terms of assistance and lending my skills to what they were
working on. The Tribunal itself also matured. In 1996 the Prosecution office was saying
“women don’t talk about these things” and you won’t find anyone who will say that now.
So I think that they has been a change in the Tribunal at all levels.
So are you saying that after a while that they matured and changed and at the same time
you were doing a lot of work with them? And as a result your tactics and strategies
evolved as well.
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Yes, that is correct. I think that you are articulating that correctly.
What specific advocacy tools were you using in the last couple of years?
In the last couple of years I was basically part of the training that was for staff in the
Prosecutor’s office. So I served as a trainer. I served as an expert witness in the trial. I
assisted in terms of research or brainstorming with the prosecution. And I still play a bit
of a role in terms of trying to push prosecutors who say that we should drop these charges
because they are not strong enough. So I am still an advocate for retaining these charges
and prosecuting them properly.
So when you say that you did trainings, were you doing trainings on investigative
strategies?
Yes. On investigating and prosecuting. The first stage is to actually collect the evidence,
which is the investigative stage. The second stage is to actually make the case in the
courtroom, which is the prosecution stage. So trying to assist at both levels. A lot of the
work on investigations was done early on when there wasn’t proper investigations, which
were hampering lawyers who were even interested in these prosecutions. The experience
in the Rwanda Tribunal, I think, very heavily influenced the way in which the Special
Court of Sierra Leone undertook their investigations. If you look at the way they have
undertaken their investigations, they did all the things that the ICTR didn’t do, which is
that it incorporated sexual violence at the beginning. It allocated specific, experience
staff to look at the sexual violence charges, it brought those charges into the courtroom in
an integrated way. Actually you will see the latest conviction of Charles Taylor actually
incorporates sexual violence charges. I think the lessons were learned from the Rwanda
Tribunal. You have to remember that the prosecution of sexual violence crimes is a
relatively new phenomenon. The Nuremburg trials did not prosecute sexual violence at
all. And the Yugoslav Tribunal was the first to do it, it was the first international court to
look at the issue seriously. So it is a very young development in law. So we are basically
creating history here. It takes a bit of time.
Were there any other organizations besides Human Rights Watch that were providing
trainings and investigative strategies and expertise to the prosecution at the ICTR?
There must be because again I said…you must speak with some people from the
prosecution to check what they relied on. But obviously they looked at UN peacekeeping
operations, they looked at the UN Human Rights Council, etc. So they were relying on a
number of places to get assistance, not just the NGOs.
During your advocacy campaign were you also collaborating with local NGOs?
Yes, absolutely. A lot of the work, in fact, all of the work was done with local NGOs,
who we assisted in a number of different ways around what the…in terms of continuing
to meet and support groups, helping them to access international advocacy venues and to
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raise their voice in different places, brining them to speak at the UN and other places to
ensure that their position was not forgotten.
So was a bigger NGO like Human Rights Watch able to facilitate access on an
international level for the local NGOs?
No, this wasn’t through Human Rights Watch, this was through the Coalition for
Women’s Human Rights in Conflict, which was a basically a coalition of many different
groups that worked through Rights and Democracy in Canada. That Coalition really did
a lot..it was an amalgamation of different interests; legal, feminists, women’s rights
groups, and individuals who came together around this issue. And just to say nothing is
ever done by just one person, it is always a collective effort of a large number of people;
the judges on the bench, the prosecution, people in the registry, etc. So it is always a
collective effort.
What was your professional background before you began to work on the research for
Shattered Lives?
So by training I am a lawyer and my background was human rights. So I started with the
Lawyer’s Committee for Human Rights and then I moved to Human Rights Watch. And
I have a Master’s in International Law from Harvard Law School.
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On May 11, 2012, Jessica Welker interviewed Ariane Brunet over the phone.
Tell me about how you created the Coalitions for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict
Situations.
Well in the 1990’s, 1993 and 1994, we had published a report on Rwanda genocide.
There was very little attention given to the issue at the time, neither by the UN or by the
international community for the violence that women had gone through in conflict
situations in the context of Rwanda. At the time there was the UN Commission and the
European Commission that came just after it, who went to Yugoslavia where the war was
raging on. So I tried to study why that was…I was at the time working as well to
influence…we won that battle to influence the Canadian government to become the
leader on that resolution for the appointment of United Nations Human Rights Special
Rapporteur on violence against women at the United Nations Human Rights
Commission, which is now called the Human Rights Council.
Then again I noticed that very little had been written on this issue. Then came in 1996 a
report Human Rights Watch that had been written by a woman called Binaifer Nowrojee
on the situation of violence against women, particularly rape, in the context of the
genocide. It was called “Shattered Lives.” That is what interested me and that is when I
started to phone Human Rights Watch, the Women’s Rights Division, and Africa Watch.
I talked to them about whether they had an interest in being part of a coalition that would
look at the issue of impunity on violence against women in conflict situations.
Immediately Africa Righst Watch was interested as well as the Women’s Rights Division
of Human Rights Watch. So after that I went to the Canadian universities and then to
CUNY, to the Women’s International Human Rights Law Clinic, which was then
directed by Rhonda Copelan (who died two years ago). The University of Toronto and
CUNY Women’s International Human Rights Law Clinic.
Well at the beginning I had many young third year university students and Ph.D. students
who got very much interested in doing the legwork for us. Then Jon (last name
undecipherable), which is now a refugee lawyer in Boston…but she was based in the
Ministry of Justice in Rwanda for a good three years at the time got interested. Then
Women in Rural Development Association in Rwanda. Then a lawyer’s women’s group
in Rwanda started to develop an interest in the violence that occurred towards women
during the genocide. Then a women’s lawyers association based in Kenya got interested.
Then the Human Rights Center at Berkley got interested. All that happened within a year
to a year and a half of the creation of the Coalition. Then I got some women’s groups
and human rights groups in Belgium to be interested and be a part of the Coalition. The
core group of people making decisions were a group of six or seven of us. And we made
the decision to try to look for a way to introduce ourselves with the Tribunal for Rwanda,
which had barely been established at the time.
So how were you all able to establish yourselves and introduce yourselves with the
tribunal?
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Well mostly because we did the amicus briefs. Well we wrote letters to the Registrar,
informing them of the creation of the coalition. We didn’t get much response at the time.
And then when we decided that we would particularly focus on the first case, which was
Jean Paul Akayesu’s case, then we decided with the help of the students both at Toronto
and CUNY University to zero in on the issue of the Jean Paul Akayesu case. We
presented an amicus brief, which was signed by well over 160 NGOs around the world,
demanding that rape be considered as an act of torture, as a war crime, as a crime of
genocide. By the defense and certainly for the jury to be aware of that and the only way
that we could do that was to submit an amicus brief.
And so what was the response of the court?
The usual…technicalities and uneasiness by the court to see NGOs, although willing to
answer us in polite ways. They started to give us the run around about technicalities. We
tried to respond to those technical points at the time, but nonetheless insisted that our
amicus brief be accepted. So we continued that fight. We didn’t win that fight, but the
fact that we continued to present amicus briefs, to correct the technicalities, certainly
raised the issue. At the time there was a sexual violence group that was created within
the Prosecutor’s Office, so we befriended the head of it at the time and we started to write
letters about Akayesu insisting that this issue had to be taken up by the Prosecution. So I
think that by constantly harping the point, first by the amicus brief, the correction to the
amicus brief, the technical letters that we sent to the Registrar’s Office, the articles that
we managed to get into various websites, and the interest that started to gather with big
NGOs like Human Rights Watch. Although Amnesty was never part of the coalition,
Amnesty started to become very much interested. They were not yet very involved with
the criminal courts as they now are with the ICC.
So when you first submitted that amicus brief and it wasn’t accepted, you said that you
made some corrections. What corrections did you have to make before re-submitting it?
Well it was really technical and I can’t remember. I am not a lawyer, but everyone else at
the coalition is a lawyer. But if my memory is correct, it had a lot to do with the fact that
we hadn’t submitted the amicus brief in the proper time. We argued that other amicus
briefs had been presented and as far as we knew they were also not submitted in the time
that was cited on the webpage. There was also an issue that we hadn’t noticed and we
had been looking at their website regularly. I mean, this was an essential part of our
work to look at the ICTR’s website and we never saw it. So there was discrepancy
between what they were saying and what we actually witnessed through the times when
we were actually looking at this website. I mean that was not admitted on the website or
was written in a way that was not visible and it was added as an afterthought they did put
the information on the website about the amicus and that it would be accepted by the
court.
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You initially said that when you were advocating at the tribunal there was an initial
uneasiness to recognize NGOs. Did that change over time? Do you feel that the court
was more receptive to the advocacy of the coalition and other NGOs on the specific topic
of sexual violence?
Unfortunately there weren’t that many NGOs. We have to be honest. And it was not
easy for Rwandan NGOs to bypass their government to make their own decisions. That
is why it was interesting that they were part of our coalition. But every year the Rwandan
government would hire within the Ministry of Justice the women who were working with
us in the various NGOs. So it was very difficult to keep track…that lawyer’s group that I
told you about…their lawyers kept being hired by the Ministry. And I can well
understand that the Rwandans would go to the Ministry because the Rwandans were very
poor at the time and such an offer could not have been bypassed. I am just trying to
explain to you why we were so few NGOs working on the Rwandan Tribunal. We were
really a minority and the NGOs that were working on the Rwanda Tribunal were part of
the Coalition. So for the longest time we (the Coalition) were alone. Just as Medical
Mundial has pretty much been alone working with the ICTY on violence against women.
It is around the same thing, it is German NGO that is based in Colon, which has done
extraordinary work on keeping track of the cases of the ICTY. They were our
counterpart working on that while we were working on the ICTR.
You had mentioned that Human Rights Watch was one of the bigger NGOs in the
Coalition, were there any other major international NGOs that were part of the Coalition.
Yes, as I said at times and on and off…FIDH, African human rights organizations,
Berkley Human Rights Center. You know my memory is faulting, but in those days…but
the core group pretty much stayed the way we are now. That was the beauty of the
Coaltion. There wasn’t a membership…nothing like a constituency. The Coalition was
composed of people who actually wanted to do the work and were volunteering their
time. So I am very happy to say that for nearly 20 years is the same people that are a part
of the working group (within the Coalition) that were doing this work on a volunteer
basis. They put in a lot of hours over the years.
I forgot the CCR (Center for Constitutional Rights). The CCR was very important…it
was a core member and still is. There were Rwandans and Kenyans who were part of the
Coalition who would go and meet with the Prosecution and talk about the cases that they
were going to present to the court. They would talk to them about our own research that
we had done in Rwanda. They told them that they should include violence against
women in the charges. They sat in on some of the cases to report to us what was going
on and how the Tribunal, judges, defense, and prosecution was handling the cases that we
were following. We could not follow every case. This was impossible because as I said
we were volunteering our time and the only persons that were paid were basically the
persons who were working at Rights and Democracy Center, where I initiated the
Coalition. People like Binaifer Nowrojee because she had been at Human Rights Watch
and wrote the only report that we knew of at the time, on sexual violence against women
during the genocide. Binaifer ended up being an expert to the court more than once,
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which was very good for us because it not only made our work visible but it also showed
the kind of research that we were able to do to assert the points that we were trying to
make and for the prosecution to deem our work important enough. So that was useful for
us.
Do you think that after having Binaifer as an expert witness at the court, the court viewed
the work of the Coalition and other NGOs as more professional or were they always
viewed as professional?
Well I don’t think that professionalism was the big issue. I think that the court has
always found that there was professionalism in the way that we were working. The doors
were open to us at the Registrar’s Office and the Prosecution Officer. So that was never
an issue for us. The issue more importantly was how much influence an NGO could have
on the proceedings and how much the court was willing to consider civil society as part
of the push to prosecute sexual violence. In 2004-2005 we did an analysis of the cases
that were presented to the Tribunal and how many of the cases add rape as part of the
accusations and how many times these cases had been dropped when there was an out of
court agreement. And 90% of the time the charges were dropped. Of all the charges that
the defendant had against him or her, rape was the first charge dropped and referred to
mediation and negotiation. If NGOs weren’t pushing, the situation would have been
worse and there would have been less chances for rape to be a part of the charges.
You were a board member for the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice. And then you
were on the advisory council for the Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice. I was
wondering if you used any similar advocacy tools and tactics that you used from your
time advocating at the ICTR.
You have to remember that one of the members of the Coalition was Rhonda Copelan.
She is key in this discussion because she was the first feminist lawyer who made a case
and wrote extremely important article to prove that rape was an act of torture and should
be considered as an act of torture. She was a member of the Coalition before she was a
member of the Caucus for Gender Justice. The Caucus worked to include violence
against women into the Rome statute. About eight of us from the Coalition were part of
the Caucus. And there were about 40-45 women in the whole process to advocate the
Rome Statute. And don’t forget that the judgment for the Jean Paul Akeyesu case had
already happened before the Rome Statute.
So we had few legal tools available to us when we sat and worked on the Caucus and the
various tactics and strategies to ensure that women’s rights and violence against women
would be included in the Statute. The fact that the Akayesu case concluded that Akayesu
had command responsibility and that rape was an act of genocide and a form of torture,
was a huge help for the Caucus when the time came to lobby and strategize in Rome.
You see what was interesting with the Coalition and the Caucus was that we knew how to
work from the European/African/North American perspective. Then came in the Latino
women who had done extraordinary good work at the American court. They came in
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with their sophisticated analysis of this issue. Some of our students finished their PhDs
with focus on command responsibility, who were key in the negotiations because of her
deep knowledge of the issue at the time. The Canadian government was very important
in the negotiation of the Rome Statute. So there is no doubt in our minds that the
presence of the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice and the many members of the
Coalition, there would not have been the inroads made at the Rome Statute. It is linked.
And are you still part of the advisory council on the Women’s Initiatives for Gender
Justice?
Yes, but I am not participating in the way that I used to. There is no doubt about
that…for the past two years.
When you were a little bit more active on the advisory council, what did you do?
We received strategies and issues to address at the ICC we would basically give our
opinion on that. And I did that as an individual, not as part of the Coalition.
Were other advisory council members people who had worked on advocating prosecution
of sexual violence at other criminal courts?
Yes, many. If you look at the advisory board, which I am sure you have, you will notice
that the quality of the people there. I think of Cecilia Medina, who did so much work at
the American court. I think of Elizabeth D, who left the advisory board because she is
now a judge at the court. I think of Kristin Chinkins who is a lawyer/professor who was
one of the judges on the War Crimes Tribunal on Sexual Slavery by the Japan military
during the Second World War. She was a very important judge for that popular tribunal
and who has done a lot of work on this issue. I see Rhonda Copelan, who is now
deceased but she was an advisory board member. And many more who do not come to
my mind. But it is a very rich advisory board.
So the advisory council strategizes and gives opinions on different tactics?
At the time, although more and more it started to be less so. Transitional justice was
something that donors were more and more willing to give money to, I would say in the
last four or five years. In our days when we started, nobody was interested in it. When
we started the Coalition, besides my own organizations which I cajoled and pushed to do
this…it was difficult to convince donors at the beginning because nobody was doing it.
But today that has tremendously changed and there is a lot of money out there for
transitional justice whether it is from a national basis or an international basis. I know
that there are millions of dollars in transitional justice. There are also budgets at UNDP,
UNHCHR, UN Women, which have changed the portraits of action in transitional justice.
So are you saying that because there has been more funding at the Women’s Initiatives
for Gender Justice to have a staff that there is less reliance on strategizing from an
advisory board?
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That is the impression that I have, but I don’t know this for a fact because I haven’t really
been a part of the board for the past two years. So I am not a good judge of that. But I
can say that they have more capacity to make decisions now because they have a stronger
staff. Before when they were very ill staffed, they needed to rely on our expertise. There
is a change in how decisions are made when you have a staff and in house decision
making processes instead of trying to reach people who are not always readily available.
And one last point. In as long as the international community gives an interest on a
particular country, transitional justice, as precarious and difficult to work, functions more
or less. But when civil society wants and insists on such a process, it is very different
battle. It is important to understand that states see civil society as a nuisance rather than
as a capacity to help. It is also true that these groups that have managed to work closer
with the ICC.
There is also victim support and reparation. Also we saw an immense need to bring
victims within the coalition and they have stayed with us. Usually women who are
victims do not want to stay victims and they become activists and it is certainly the case
in conflict situations. Victims kept saying to us years after years that transitional justice
did not mean much for them, it wasn’t doing much for them. They had been ridiculed.
You can read in Binaifer Nowrojee’s excellent essay on the Rwandan Tribunal, the issue
of the laughing judges. It was a case where the defending lawyer pushed and pushed the
victim to describe exactly the rape in detail and she couldn’t. It is not her culture to say
that kind of stuff in front of men she didn’t know, she fumbled, and at one point the
judges laughed at her. To us, it was the biggest scandal that we could think of. Binaifer
wrote a beautiful and heartfelt piece on this. This was 2004-2005 and we started to
understand that couldn’t only be technical and looking at the impunity issues, we have to
pay attention to what the victims are saying. Redress, an organization that focused on
victims joined the Coalition. We started to look at two issues. Number one was that we
had to pay attention to the laughing judges and what that meant. We decided to fight for
the protection of witnesses. We wrote numerous letters on how women who were raped
needed to be differently protected and how their needs needed to be met when they were
coming to the Hague and Tanzania. How they themselves viewed the protection and
services offered to defendants at the court. They saw the accused with protection and
medicine. The second struggle was looking at the remedy of reparations. We invited
victims, activists, and lawyers from all over the world to present a declaration to the
judges of the ICC. We were amazed by the excellent reception that we got from the ICC
and the voluntary fund of the ICC. We have to admit that an old member of the Coalition
became the president of the voluntary fund for the victims at the ICC, which helped. It is
important to say this because I don’t want to say that the only thing that counted to use
was the relation to the court. But the relations with the victims and how to improve their
protection and reparations were also important.
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